

University Studies—No. 3.

STUDIES
IN
VEDANTISM.

BY
KRISHNA CHANDRA BHATTACHARYYA, M.A.



Calcutta :

PUBLISHED BY THE CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY AND PRINTED
AT THE BAPTIST MISSION PRESS.

1909.




सत्यमेव जयते

CONTENTS.

	<i>Page</i>
INTRODUCTION	v
I. AN APPROACH THROUGH PSYCHOLOGY ..	1
II. VEDANTIC METAPHYSICS	18
III. VEDANTIC LOGIC	51
ANALYSIS	71



सत्यमेव जयते



सत्यमेव जयते

INTRODUCTION.

The following studies in Vedantism are not so much expositions of the traditional Vedanta as problematic constructions on Vedantic lines intended to bring out the relations of the system to modern philosophical systems. The work of construction has, however, been subordinated to the work of interpretation. A wide latitude of interpretation has been claimed throughout.

The studies follow the traditional authorities, the *Upanishads*, the *Brahma-sūtras*, and *Bhagavad-gītā*, and confine themselves to the monistic interpretations of *Sankara*. They draw on treatises like *Panchadaśī*, *Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvali*, etc., propounding what may be called the later Vedanta, for such definite views as may be regarded to be legitimate systematisations of the earlier but looser Vedanta. No attempt has been made here to trace the historical evolution of the Vedantic school.

The historical study of a school of thought must have methods and aims different from those of a philosophical study, though the studies are mutually supplementary. The philosophical study should come first in the order of time; the historical study of an ancient system of philosophy, to be of any use at all, must be preceded by an earnest study of the philosophy, in the expositions traditionally accepted as authoritative. The correctness of these expositions—at any rate, the perspective—may be impugned afterwards by historic research. But the historian here cannot begin his work at all unless he can live in sympathy into the details of an apparently outworn creed and recognise the *truth* in the first imperfect adumbrations of it. The attitude of the mere narrator has, in the case of the historian of philosophy, to be exchanged, as far as possible, for that of the sympathetic interpreter. There is the danger, no doubt, of too easily reading one's philosophic creed into the history, but the opposite danger is more serious still. It is the danger of taking the philosophic type studied as a historic curiosity rather than a recipe for the human soul, and of seeking to explain the curiosity by natural *causes* instead of seriously examining its merits as philosophy. This unfortunately is sometimes the defect of Western expositions of Eastern philosophy and religion. It springs from a tacit conviction, which, to say the least, bespeaks a lack of historic sense, that the common-sense evolved at the present day is absolutely infallible; though if the history of philosophy were rightly studied, it would show

that many of the modern speculative *discoveries* are but reaffirmations of old truths, and that the present-day common sense itself is a complex structure in which are imbedded types of thought which are ordinarily taken to be completely outworn and superseded. We have heard of Indian pessimism and fatalism disposed of by a sapient reference to the climatic and political conditions of the country; and the very name of philosophy has sometimes been denied to Indian speculation on the ground, apparently established historically, that the Oriental intellect is not sufficiently dry and has not masculine virility enough to rise to anything higher than grotesque imaginative cosmogonies. When history thus sits in judgment on philosophy, an Indian student of Vedānta may well be excused if to him a reproduction of the philosophy, such as may bring it into contact with modern problems, appears far more important than any mere historical dissertation.

A fair instance of how principles of historic research are sometimes allowed to prejudice a right appreciation of philosophy is afforded by Dr. Thibaut's otherwise valuable introduction to his translation of the *Vedānta-sūtras*, with *Sankara's* commentary (Sacred Books of the East, vol. xxxiv). Referring to the attempts of *Sankara* and other scholiasts to evolve a complete philosophic system from the *Upanishads*, he says: "On later generations, to which the whole body of texts came down as revealed truth, there devolved the inevitable task of establishing systems on which no exception could be taken to any of the texts; but that the task was, strictly speaking, an impossible one, *i.e.*, one which it was impossible to accomplish fairly and honestly, there really is no reason to deny" (p. cvi). The texts "do not allow themselves to be systematised because they were never meant to form a system" (p. cxiv). "...But the task of systematising once given, we are quite ready to admit that *Sankara's* system is the best that can be devised" (p. cxvii). The contention here apparently is that the task is *not* given, except to one who believes the texts to embody revealed truth.

Now, what precisely is the task to which *Sankara* has addressed himself? It is not that of the critical historian, it is the task of piecing together the several texts into a philosophical system, of developing a hypothesis on a necessary basis which will cover all the texts. But it may be asked, why should it be assumed that all the texts should find place in a necessary system? May not some of them embody false speculations altogether? Here, then, we have to consider the special nature of the *Upanishad* texts. They may or may not have been revealed; but as they are, they are presented not as mere guesses from the outside to explain the facts of the Universe, nor even as

leisurely philosophisings conducted on a necessary basis, but as embodying mystic intuitions, often the products of what has been called the mythologic imagination which *sees* philosophy in poetic symbols. There are sometimes attempts at reasoning, too, but then by themselves they are hardly logically convincing, having not unoften an almost infantine naïveté about them. Now, the question here is, what should be our attitude towards these texts which, apparently at any rate, embody intuitions? So long as no obvious mark of spuriousness is discovered, they are to be regarded as genuine, though even a genuine intuition may be false in its content. The falsity, however, is not to be judged *a priori* but only after a strenuous endeavour to reproduce, if possible, the intuitions through such means as may have been laid down in the *śāstras*, or, what we understand better, after an attempt to systematise all the texts into a well-rounded philosophy. The latter is the task which *Sankara* and other commentators have set themselves to accomplish. Hence admitting that the texts were never meant to be strung together into a system, it can still be held that the task of systematising is inevitably given to every student of the *Upanishads*.

Dr. Thibaut does not appear to have sufficiently distinguished the rôle of the philosophic systematiser from that of the critical or historical scholar when he lays down the caution that "we must refrain from using unhesitatingly and without careful consideration of the merits of each individual case, the teachings, direct or inferred, of any one passage to the end of determining the drift of the teaching of other passages." A commentator is certainly open to severe censure when he asserts that a text bears a certain *meaning* which it cannot bear in a particular context. But when he simply means that the truth embodied in a particular text is inadequately expressed and should be developed or rendered more explicit in the light of other texts, or when he interprets a mythologic metaphor differently in different passages under the conviction that it is a natural symbol of many correspondent truths of different potencies or grades, he is to be deemed as perfectly within his rights as a philosophic interpreter and systematiser. A philosophic commentator, especially on unsystematised texts embodying speculative truths, has a far wider latitude than a literary commentator. Exegetical interpretation here inevitably shades off into philosophic construction; and this need not involve any intellectual dishonesty. We may readily admit that "what he (the commentator) from his advanced standpoint looks upon as an inferior kind of cognition" was not "viewed in the same way by the authors of the *Upanishads*," but that may have been because the teacher of the inferior

wisdom had not in view the antithesis between it and the superior wisdom. *Sāṅdilya*, the teacher of the *Sāṅdilya-vidyā* in the *Chhāndogya Upanishad*, may not have "looked upon it as anything else but a statement of the highest truth accessible to man," but that is no reason why *Sankara* may not look upon it as the inferior wisdom. It would appear, too, as though the distinction between the higher and the lower wisdom was taken by Dr. Thibaut and some others to be wider than *Sankara* himself intended; to *Sankara*, the *Saguṇa* (determinate) Brahman and the *Nirguṇa* (indeterminate) Brahman were not so much distinct gods as the contrasted aspects of the same reality.

A misconception of the latitude allowed to philosophic systematisation may be traced in Dr. Thibaut's remarks on *Sankara's* doctrine of *Māyā*. He tries to demonstrate that *Sankara's* doctrine of *Māyā* is nowhere to be found in the *Upanishads* except probably in an undeveloped form in a few doubtful passages, and contends that the doctrine should not, therefore, be read into other passages which are intelligible without it. Let it be granted for the present that the demonstration is satisfactory. Later on he admits that the doctrine of "the final absolute identification of the individual self with the universal self is indicated in terms of unmistakable plainness" (p. cxxii) in the *Upanishads*. Now if the point were discussed as one of philosophy rather than of historical scholarship, it would not be difficult to perceive that the doctrine of *Māyā* is a necessary corollary of this doctrine of the individual being Brahman in *Moksha* (absolute liberation): for it is only in this identification that he realises that individuality was an illusion and that the distinction of subject, object, etc., possible only through this individuality, was an illusion too.

In a reproduction of Vedantism such as we have proposed, no attempt need be made to distinguish the points common to the Indian systems from those which are specifically Vedantic. Special care, however, should be taken to develop from first principles such Vedantic positions as being distinctively Indian present a marked contrast to European habits of thought. There are sundry deep-seated differences between Eastern and Western speculation. To European common sense, certain forms of Indian speculation may appear absurd or puerile at the best; while now and then there are presented heights and depths of thought which take away and stifle one's breath, and which an all too comfortable rationalism designates hypersubtle and mystical. An attempt should be made to show that in some cases at least the contradiction to European common sense or scientific thought is only apparent, and that the Indian position, properly understood, whether true or false, is a development of

thought in an unsuspected direction, though by no means incompatible with Western thought ; while in certain other cases where there is real contradiction to European common sense, an analysis of this apparently absolute standard may, peradventure, yield dissolving views in which the Eastern thought is found to alternate with its Western counterpart with the naïveté of a summer dream. As to what is vaguely called the mysticism of Vedanta a clearing-up should be attempted in a more than ordinarily strenuous spirit of rationalism. Only it should content itself with a problematic indication of the direction in which the dark truths lie without pretending to furnish omniscient *explanations*.

The attitude to be borne towards the present subject should be neither that of the apologist nor that of the academic compiler but that of the interpreter which involves, to a certain extent, that of the constructor, too. It is too late in the day to *defend* a system like the Vedanta with a theologian's animus ; it is hardly necessary, except probably to silence a class of persons whose ignorance of the system is matched only by their zeal in combating it ; and it is, to say the least, unwise, even for one who has implicit faith in the system, for to drag it into the theological arena is to effectually scare away all open-minded men from it and relegate it for good to the limbo of oblivion. The Vedantic propagandist cannot do better than appeal through a literature wholly expository, without a word of dogmatic lecturing in it, which will invite readers—it may be, a select class of them—to contemplate with something of an æsthetic sympathy an ancient life-ideal animating an organised body of ancient thought, just to quicken, it may be for a moment, the consciousness, always very torpid, of the dominating ideal of the day being only one among many possibles ; and then if Vedanta has any real vitality in it, it will set them thinking till it leads to a real division of the spirit. A true philosophic system is not to be looked upon as a soulless jointing of hypotheses ; it is a living fabric which, with all its endeavour to be objective, must have a well-marked individuality. Hence it is not to be regarded as the special property of academic philosophy-mongers, to be hacked up by them into technical *views*, but is to be regarded as a form of life and is to be treated as a theme of literature of infinite interest to humanity.



सत्यमेव जयते

Studies in Vedantism.

I.—An Approach through Psychology.

The psychology of waking, dream, and dreamless sleep constitutes the pivot of the Vedantic system and of certain other systems, like the *Yoga*, which may be regarded as ancillary to it. It is to be regarded as a clear addition to ordinary psychology, the importance of which is not a whit exaggerated if it is claimed that it recognises a new dimension of existence altogether. Its importance will be appreciated by connecting it with kindred Western speculations on the one hand, and with Vedantic speculations in Metaphysics on the other.

2. What would be the empirical account of a dream? Physiological speculation on the point has hardly anything to offer except certain platitudes which do not touch the speciality of the phenomenon; and so the psychological explanation alone is worth referring to here. When a man goes to sleep, images are roused in his mind, sometimes by sensory presentations, but most often with apparent spontaneity, although even in such cases the absence of an ideal suggestion, *continuous with a sensory presentation*, cannot be absolutely proved. In waking perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations, the ideational elements are generally copies of previous percepts (sometimes involving new construction also); but these do not appear at random, being attracted into definite grooves of suggestion by the presentative elements and by attention as determined by practical interests. In dreams, too, we have copies of waking percepts, but imaginative construction is here far freer, there being normally no restrictive and directive action of sensation on the one hand, and of connective attention on the other. Many events and combinations of events which would be at once deemed to be impossible in waking life would not be questioned at all in a dream. In waking life, many associations or constructions are ruled out, prevented from even appearing in consciousness, by certain beliefs determined by our practical necessities. Even sensations and percepts are occasionally so ruled out. At the same time, in waking life, there are different degrees of seriousness or concentration of attention on what directly subserves life; there are stages of listlessness, play, æsthetic and philosophic consciousness. So long, however, as the consciousness of a *body* is there, we cannot 'become a living soul'; the body always demands a measure

of attention, while outer stimuli are continually stirring it up and starting ever-renewed trains of association. In dreams, the distractions of this 'heavy' body are reduced to a minimum, sometimes disappearing altogether; the necessity of practical life is not so tyrannic, and hence there is unrestrained credulity. But why should there be a belief at all? Objectification carries a naïve belief with it, unless it is definitely contradicted by some other belief. The idea of the object is not known to be a *mere* idea, unless contradicted by some perception or by a more vivid or coherent idea.

3. We may conceive a stage of dream proper—there being transitional stages between waking and dreaming—where there are no sensations and the consciousness of the body is at a minimum. Here the object-consciousness must be purer than in the waking stage, *i.e.*, freer from reference to body; the self, too, is not mere idea of body but is the seer of ideas (*cf. Drishter Drashtā* or seer of seeing). So in a dream, things appear to come in and go out without startling or surprising us—they are recognised as matters of course. Space and time tend to lose their reference to the body, and so violations of continuity occasion no surprise at all. There is no tyrannic continuous memory, no rigid demand for uniformity, no compunction for not being in a line with truth—a glorious life of thoughtless thoughtfulness.

4. Does this account of a dream justify us in taking it to belong to a *new dimension* of psychical existence? The continuous gradations from waking consciousness to dream proper need not preclude us from admitting such a new dimension. Dreams may be described as perceptions without sensation. Is there any difference in kind between perception with sensation and perception without sensation? The question would roughly resolve itself into the old question about the existence of a qualitative difference between impression and idea. The differentiae of impression and idea that are ordinarily proposed are not really satisfactory. As to the criterion of vividness, it is altogether adventitious to knowledge as knowledge; besides ideas appear less vivid than sensations only when they coexist, and that, too, not in all cases. The criterion of being affected by movement is unsatisfactory, for in dreams, where we have admittedly nothing but ideas, objects are affected by our dream-movements; here, too, the test is useful only when impression and idea coexist. As to the other criterion, inner coherence, it may be pointed out that the incoherence of a dream is not felt as such within the dream; besides, sensations as sensations have no coherence, and we may have incoherent perceptions riding roughshod over all our expectations. There is nothing left but

the felt abruptness or *given*-ness (independence of self would be going too far, as self-consciousness may not have been developed) of the impression, as distinct from the freedom, the playlike, easy, unquestioning movement of attention in ideas and dreams. In framing to ourselves a difficult combination of ideas, in introspection, in the effort to recollect, a resistance no doubt is offered by percepts or habits of thought generated by sense-experience; but as the self prevails against it, the ideal functioning is felt to be free, the easiest to the self.

5. This shows that sensation and idea are not co-ordinate in reality, and to overlook this is a fundamental vice of Empirical Psychology. The idea may unconsciously animate the sensation (perception is a 'presentative-representative' cognition); but this unconscious working is absolutely different from its conscious existence. The conscious idea, while recognising itself to have been operative in the percept, absolutely disowns its unconscious sensuous character; e.g., when an illusion is corrected by careful observation, the idea simulating a percept is known to be a *mere* idea, but the illusory percept vanishes altogether without caring to court a comparison with the true percept. Thus we have three distinct mental states throwing light on one another; (1) perception in which idea unconsciously works, (2) such perception coexisting with a conscious idea, where the idea is regarded as inferior in reality to the percept, and (3) the pure idea, hardly ever realised in waking consciousness (except probably in the fluid transparency of the poet's intuition, in spontaneous clairvoyance, or in the settled vision of the *Yogin*), to which the waking world would appear unsubstantial. The last state is one to which all have not access, and would be disbelieved altogether, were it not for the fact that we have a daily illustration of its *possibility* in our dreams. In dreams, the ideas do not consciously remember the corresponding waking percepts, they are at once percepts.

6. Not that dream is truer than waking percept. Each is true within itself: but while 'the former is daily sublated, the latter is sublated only under exceptional circumstances' (*Sankara*). The truth of this or that waking percept may sometimes be denied in a dream as it may be denied in waking life itself; but dreams do not deny the truth of waking life as a whole, for they never doubt their own waking character. Waking, however, always denies the truth of dreams.

7. We have already, however, found reason to believe that the dream-world is wider in *possibility* than the waking world. The dependence of waking perception on sensation shows its limitation. Sensation, far from being the final standard of truth, is by itself the farthest from the truth; belief is easiest

in self-consciousness. Internal perception is prior to external, logically if not chronologically. The sensation is felt to give us reality, only because the idea unconsciously animates it. The element of representation in perception is the element of interpretation or knowledge. But then it must be borne in mind that this unconscious working of the idea is known only when we have come to be reflective or self-conscious. Even then the sense-conditioned consciousness informed with the idea is felt to be higher in point of truth than the mere idea set over against it. But that is because practical attention or the self is not yet dissociated from the body; anything not directly ministering to the life of the body is taken to be unreal. With the development of the mind, the self and its interests come to be more and more dissociated from the body—we come to infer and deliberate and have abstract interests; still, except in very rare cases, the imperious call of the body is not silenced, and the body-dissociated mental processes are still felt to be rational only when ministering to the bodily life, though it may be indirectly. A solemn, but often ineffective, protest is recorded by our moral, æsthetic, religious, and speculative aspirations, though they, too, sometimes appear to accept bribes of the emissaries of this body.

8. Will is essentially a denial of the existing sense-order; knowledge, too, by its very nature, is an emergence from the body, *i.e.*, from sense-homogeneity. Yet both are ordinarily *for* the life of the body. But the moral will, on the one hand, and æsthetic intuition on the other (not to speak of other forms of absolute consciousness), disown this slavery and affirm the independence of the idea. The body, however, does its best to ignore their protest. They are felt to be only aspirations for pure knowledge, not knowledge; they tell us only that the body *ought not* to be the truth, though it unhappily seems to be the truth. The ineffectiveness of their protest is explained from our present point of view by the contrast felt between the sense-percept and the idea when they coexist, it being erroneously supposed that our ideas always coexist with some sense-percept—with the presentation of the body at least, if no other presentation is forthcoming. That with mere idea, we may have what may be called a 'feeling of knowledge,' the consciousness of knowing as distinct from thinking or imagining, is brought out, however, in dreams. This explains the importance that is attached in Indian Philosophy to this unique psychological phenomenon. There is no other phenomenon in our ordinary psychic life like it; even in hallucination, as has been recently pointed out, there is some real sense-objective and some real peripheral excitation from within.

9. Dreams are, however, illusory. An idea is felt to be true so long as it is not contradicted by sense-perception. For though sensations do not produce knowledge, they signalise the occasions, cosmically determined, when breaches are effected in the leaden walls of insensibility, when the idea, in fact, unconsciously follows the law of truth. The ideal of knowledge is, however, attained when the idea freely or consciously follows law, without being drawn down to interpret a sensation. Dreams, no doubt, are illusory; but then if only we possessed ourselves in dreams, if only we could exercise the control of attention over the riotous dance of the images which there comport themselves as percepts without sensations, if only, having cut away from the moorings of this oppressively constant presentation of this body, we could find secure anchorage in a freer, purer, more comprehensive self, we could assure ourselves of a far more complete vision of the truth than we could conceive ourselves to attain in this waking life. We could then transcend this space and time which have the body and the present moment as their points of reference, this space and time which coop us up and cabin us in; we could, then, not only intuitively perceive the distant, the past, and the future, take in at a glance what we have now to explore piecemeal—dimly, slowly, laboriously—we could aspire to know noumenon, life, self.

10. All this may be entertained as a hypothesis, if not as a demonstrated fact. That, however, it may not be deemed inadmissible even as hypothesis, its 'objective possibility' has to be exhibited by tracing its *vera causa*. There are three suppositions: (1) perception without sensation; (2) the self-conscious knowledge of all space as one object, and of all time as one unfolded panorama; (3) the self swooning into the realisation of noumenon, life, self. The *veræ causæ* respectively are (1) conscious dream, (2) self-conscious dream, and (3) dreamless sleep. That the conscious dream explains the possibility of perception without sensation has already been explained. The other two require elucidation.

11. Most of our dreams are self-conscious. Here the self's relation with the object is peculiarly different from its relation in waking life. In waking life, as has already been indicated, the object reports itself by a sensational shock; here, however, the object comes in and goes out unquestioned without startling us. Besides, here the self is, or seems at least to be, free from the body; sometimes it even sees the body lying asleep; it is not located anywhere and yet it looks at space. Violations of continuity do not surprise it at all (section 3), though the objects are still in space. This could be understood in the merely conscious dream, where each isolated image,

as it floats up, turns into a percept; but how can there be *self-conscious knowledge* of such *spatial* objects violating the laws of space-continuity, unless we suppose that the self sees here *with the whole of space as one function*? Similarly with time. Besides here seeing is apparently creating (for here is no *given* abrupt sensation); the self seems to freely create its world, its space and time, its joys and sorrows. No doubt it only *seems*; really these creations are the images of waking percepts now freely accepted and so apparently created.

12. But why should there be this or that specific combination of images rather than any other? That implies the functioning of certain synthetic concepts from behind, *i.e.*, concepts on the same level as the self. We have here to admit, therefore, a new level or 'plane' of consciousness. These synthetic concepts might have been generated by individual experience or inherited as the capitalised value of ancestral experience—anyway they are now timeless psychic forces ordering the distribution of the images.

13. A similar question may be asked with regard to sense-experience also. The sensations have been described as the cosmically determined occasions on which knowledge is permitted to manifest itself from within. But why should the right interpreting idea materialise itself on the occasion of a sensation? There must be some correspondence between the life within that supplies the right idea and the life without that supplies the sensation. It reminds one of the objection sometimes taken to Kant's doctrine of the forms that it does not explain why the manifold of intuition does not get into wrong forms. Dualism of subject and object has to be admitted, at least so long as we conceive ourselves to be individuals; only this correspondence between them is mysterious. It will not do to say that the object not only gives the sensation but also begets the association-traces which bring the right idea to the interpretation of the sensation. For so long as we admit that to know anything is to assimilate it, the *primum cognitum* cannot be explained by the causality of the object. We must admit an idea behind all presentation: a *regressus in infinitum* has to be accepted. So why a person should have certain sense-experiences rather than any other can only be understood in the light of the principle that every man freely accepts, if not makes, his circumstances. Every man is born with the seed of all his future psycho-physical existence, with instincts for action and original dispositions for certain forms of cognition. How these themselves have been generated is an enquiry which will lead us away from our present topic. It will suffice here to indicate that the knowledge-seeds and the action-seeds are not absolutely

distinct, and that it is a community of these *Karma*-seeds, as they might be called, of different persons, that gets manifested into this common phenomenal world.

14. Can we rise in knowledge above these functioning concepts or *Karma*-seeds? In self-conscious dream, there is time, though it is apparently created at every moment. But the hidden springs of these creations cannot themselves be in time. They are in timeless unity with the self. How, then, can knowledge transcend them? This, however, is shown to be possible by dreamless sleep or *sushupti* as it is called. In this stage, the self, dissociated not only from the body but also from the mind, rests in itself. It is then *immediately* conscious of itself, not conscious of itself as returning to itself in reflection. It is then identical with what Kant calls 'transcendental unity of apperception'; only it is then not the mere 'fringe' of determinate empirical consciousness but is in complete isolation. It is not a mere thought, an unreal abstraction, but a concrete reality.

15. Here we meet with an objection from ordinary Psychology. Admitting the existence of the self as an entity behind the mental states, one may hold that in dreamless sleep, the self is unconscious, not self-conscious. Let us dwell on the stock Vedantic argument on the point. When a man rises from dreamless sleep, he becomes aware that he had a blissful sleep during which he was conscious of nothing. This he knows directly from memory. Now memory is only of a presentation. Therefore the bliss and the consciousness of nothing must have been *presented* during the sleep. If it be objected that only the *absence* during sleep of disquiet and knowledge is *inferred* from a memory of the state before the sleep and the perception of the state after the sleep, it is asked in reply, can we *infer* anything, the like of which was never presented? If reasoning is only a manipulation of rarefied images, the images can have been derived only from percepts. But it may be urged that the negative concept, at any rate, could not have had any percept corresponding to it, and therefore one may justifiably hold the *absence* of knowledge and disquiet during sleep to have been inferred. To this it is replied that absence cannot be inferred, unless it be conceivable. The absence of knowledge cannot be referred to, unless the absence be the object of a direct consciousness of it *during the absence*. Like knowledge, the absence of knowledge cannot be known by external perception or any form of inference founded on it, but by internal perception or self-feeling. No *inference* can ever warrant us in attributing absence of consciousness to any object. If the paradox were allowed, a psychic thing or absence of a psychic thing, if conceived, is actual: its *esse* is its *concupi*—a peculiarity of hypothesis in

Psychology which deserves to be noticed. Not that the absence of determinate knowledge need be known explicitly during the absence ; one who is born blind is not conscious of not seeing. But if such a man comes to see, like Cheselden's patient, he will have an explicit perception of the previous absence of seeing which will at the same time be a recognition of the absence as that implicitly cognised during the absence.

16. If, then, the direct consciousness during the absence be granted, then the consciousness of the absence immediately after the absence, *i.e.*, immediately on waking, would be called memory rather than inference. Now what is the direct consciousness of the absence of knowledge and disquiet during deep sleep ? It can only be the 'undifferented knowledge and bliss' set over against negation. The mind or empirical consciousness lapses here altogether ; we have pure consciousness against a 'dark ground,' pure consciousness of a blank objectivity or 'object in general' (Kant). All sensation and all concrete image then lapse into a blank homogeneity. Through a right understanding of this *sushupti* state, we reach the conceptions of *chaitanya*, or the pure self, and of *avidyā*, or the primal blank which is rendered definite by the self ; so that to say that the pure self is immediately conscious of itself in deep sleep is only to state a verbal proposition.

17. The nature of the self, as pure consciousness, is often disputed, and the dispute turns on the way in which this *sushupti* is understood. It has been variously held against the foregoing view that in this state, the self is, (1) non-existent, or (2) unconscious, or (3) both conscious and unconscious. All these views find their parallel in the views which have been held about self-consciousness. To know is to recognise ; when the self first comes to know itself, it recognises itself. But recognition means a previous moment of self-forgetfulness. Now when the self forgot itself, was it non-existent or only non-intelligent ? (1) If the *esse* of the self is its *percipi*, the unknown self would be the non-existent self. (2) But if the present self-consciousness be taken as a proof of the eternal existence of the self, then the self should be taken as sometimes unconscious, sometimes conscious—unconscious when dissociated from the empirical mind, conscious when associated with it. (3) Or if self-consciousness means consciousness of the self as having been *operative*, not merely existent, in the consciousness preceding it (and giving the whole truth to it), then when the self forgot itself, it was both conscious and unconscious. Finally, if the self, as it comes back to itself, feels that its self-alienated stage was utterly illusory, then it is not only eternally existent and consciously operative, but eternally *self-conscious*, too.

18. The empiricist, of whom the dogmatic nihilist and the absolute sceptic are the logical descendants, holds the self before self-consciousness to be immediate negation. The abstract conceptualist holds it to be immediate position, and that essentially, even during self-consciousness, as to him 'being cognised' is adventitious to the being of an object. The Kantian takes the self before self-consciousness to have been immanently operative in consciousness; yet when the self comes back to itself in empirical self-consciousness, in recognising itself it still feels that it does not know its essential nature, for the same thing cannot be at once subject and object. The self, as it comes back, just gives a flash of recognition, but anon it shoots forward, by its inertia, as it were, in a spiral rather than in a circular orbit. The self constantly aspires to catch itself and as constantly slips from itself. As long as self-consciousness is a process—and no determinate knowledge that is not a process is conceivable—it is thus a spiral motion, apparently beginningless and endless. The rapidly intermittent flashes of recognition appear to give a continuous line of light or a knowledge of the self, which is, however, only a 'paralogism of the pure reason.' The Hegelian takes the motion to be an eternal *circular* or perfect motion, consciousness before self-consciousness being only an arc of the circle setting up for itself, each minute arc itself a straight line; but when the circle is completed (*i.e.*, when self-consciousness arises), the self recognises that these straight lines are only *for* the circle, that the circle is the truth that contains in itself the ideality of the straight lines. Here the Vedantist will, however, hold that the self at each point only illusorily *fancies* itself to be moving in a straight line; and as long as it moves, it can never take in the entire circle at once; and so even when it recognises itself, the illusion does not completely disappear. The blind impulse forward is real by reason of its very imperiousness; the flashes of self-recognition appearing now occasionally, now frequently, and at last continuously, the self feels at once in triumph and in humility that it is moving in a spiral inwards towards the centre of light (the true self), though the centre is still infinitely remote, content only to have more and more light; and ever as it presses forward with accelerated speed, it takes the past dimness as due only to his limitation of ignorance, till behold, it has reached the centre of light itself where it quiescently spins a circular motion. Who could have imagined that the spiral had the centre within a finite distance? This quiescent circular motion was all along the ideal of the process of knowledge; this was the contentless aspiration towards the thing-in-itself, this the formless indefinable sense of the Beyond in all determinate knowledge. Nor was

the circle of light, constituted by the flashes of self-recognition, ever becoming more and more refulgent, altogether a 'paralogism'; for though the spread-out character of the process was false, the light was the reflection of this central self-manifesting light. Thus Vedanta reconciles Kant and Hegel by admitting the impossibility of the self being caught in a process of self-consciousness, and yet holding the process to be a self-manifestation of the self.

19. Does not, however, Hegel too admit that the self's movement in a circle is illusorily self-alienated in consciousness and that it is self-contained in self-consciousness? Does not Vedanta admit that even at the centre, the self, though quiescent, is spinning a circular process? The difference, as will be more fully explained afterwards, is that whereas Vedanta takes even this central motion to be the reflection of the self on the negation which falls beyond it, *i.e.*, to be absolutely free self-creation, Hegel takes this reflection on the negation to be the ultimate reality. Not that even Hegel takes it to be *necessity* or God's *given nature*. No one is a more strenuous advocate of freedom; but then freedom has two sides, the quiescence of self beyond will and its quiescence in pure will. The former is Vedantic *Brahman*, the latter is Vedantic *Isvara*, a point to be cleared up later on. The latter is also Hegel's Absolute Idea, to which will and intellect are the same.

20. This difference between Hegel and Vedanta is connected with a fundamental difference regarding the conception of self between Kant's synthetic unity of apperception and the Vedantic *ātman* or *chaitanya*. They are generally regarded as the same, and in fact there is a good deal of similarity between them. Kant's self, though transcending empirical consciousness, is individualised in a sense, for it is this which becomes practical as will, emerging as a postulate directly implied by morality. Even if we do not allow the conclusions of the practical reason to prejudice those of pure reason, even if we take the self to be the formless prefix of all cognition, transcending even the categories and forms through which it works in knowledge, we have yet to admit that in Kant, this self is *for* knowledge of the thing-in-itself, is relative to a constant something, has the thing-in-itself constantly before it; its very nature is aspiring to know the thing-in-itself, the 'object-in-general' being the obverse of this aspiration, the blank canvas on which it wants to have the thing-in-itself pictured (what, however, is never accomplished). So whether individualised or not, it is still *agent*, the form of *knowing* rather than of *knowledge*. In Vedanta, however, the self is the breath of this knowledge, the light of consciousness, something eternally accomplished rather than

being accomplished. The accomplishing self cannot be said to have finally triumphed over empiricism or absolute scepticism. This seems to be the trend of Spencer's views also. He would not admit the current argument against absolute scepticism, that it is proving the falsity of reason by reason; that, he would say, at best shows that within the sphere of determinate cognition, the self (or rather the dominating cohesion of the ideas of subject and object) is the highest truth; but then this cognition itself tells us that it is a cohesion generated by experience, and that therefore we cannot pronounce it to be absolutely necessary. Who knows that ever this cohesion may not break down with further experience? That it cannot be conceived is no argument for the moment something is said to be inconceivable, it is pronounced to be conceivable by implication. The subject of the proposition, 'this cannot be conceived' is in fact a *conceived-inconceivability*. This is only a negative conceivability, however. It is only an 'indefinable sense of the Beyond,' mere *matter* of knowledge without positive *form*. In the very humility of accepting absolute scepticism as a possible view, there is the transcendence of it, in which, however, there is no differenced self to enjoy the triumph.

21. Hegel does not admit the possibility of an absolute scepticism impugning the reality of the self or reason, and therefore does not recognise an undifferenced consciousness. Kant's pronouncements are rather uncertain on the point; but then his 'Refutation of Idealism' may be taken as founded essentially on the recognition of a form of cognition other than the determinate. Much has been made, ever since Schopenhauer's unfortunate pronouncement on the point, of the so-called inconsequence in Kant of taking causality to be a category of the self and yet riding out on this category beyond the self to the thing-in-itself as the cause of our sensations. Kant, it should be remembered, expressly points out a fundamental difference in applicability between the dynamical and the mathematical categories. The difference comes out again in the different solutions he has given of the first two cosmological antinomies on the one hand and the last two on the other. The mathematical categories have no reference except to phenomena in space and time, but the dynamical categories while referring to phenomena refer essentially beyond them to the free and the self-existent, although this reference cannot be concreted by intuition. The thing-in-itself in Kant is not, however, to be confounded with his noumena or Ideas of the Reason, which are only the reason-pictures of the essentially unknowable. The self, as causality imbedded in all determinate cognition, asks for the cause of itself. Experience demands its own cause; the causal aspiration is like a

flame informing the fuel of experience and yet freely existing by itself. This demand of the self is not satisfied by the Idea of the Reason, for that is only the way in which the cause of the self, *i.e.*, of causality, *i.e.*, of experience would be known, if it could be known at all. This difficulty with regard to causality applies more or less to the whole of the understanding, *i.e.*, the self as knowing objects; for even when the self recognises itself, it is puzzled to find itself *unconsciously* informing objects. It asks 'Why did I know object at all,' just as it might ask in another connexion, 'Why did I sin at all.' It feels the ground insecure beneath its feet. So Spencer finds that the cohesion within our knowledge of subject and object demands itself an object beyond knowledge, the Unknowable, from both the points, object-consciousness and subject-consciousness. Now this demand, alike in Kant and in Spencer, is indeterminate but none the less real.

22. Neither Kant nor Spencer has brought out in full the implications of this indeterminate consciousness. They have not made it clear whether it is a subjective process only or the absolute reality. As indeterminate, can it be said to be different from the thing-in-itself or the Unknowable? It seems to have equal relations with the self and the Unknowable. The self itself becomes real in it. It is the undifferentenced consciousness that plays on all determinate cognition. Beyond the will, there is the self-affirmation of the intellect; but beyond this self-affirming pulsation, there is the pure undifferentenced self or *Chaitanya*. The thing-in-itself cannot be said to be different from this undifferentenced *Chaitanya*, cannot be said to be its reference. Yet it is a significant fact that neither Kant nor Spencer calls this undifferentenced self-doubting consciousness the self or the subject. This vacillation on their part is explained by the fact that when this consciousness and the determinate consciousness (which is always accompanied by the former) coexist, the former, though felt to give all the reality that the latter has, still appears to be a formless shadow in comparison with the latter, which is informed by it. It is in fact the old difficulty about the percept and idea reappearing on a higher plane. Schelling and Hegel disregarded the contrast and imagined they found, in the æsthetic and religious consciousness especially, the consciousness negating individuality to be much more real than determinate experience. Kant, however, would have argued against them that these coloured consciousnesses, the æsthetic and the religious, can never warrant us in taking the de-individualised consciousness as more than a mere aspiration, *i.e.*, as knowledge, as the absolute self, as an eternally accomplished cognition. If Hegel argues that his Absolute Idea is not

accomplished only—for then there would be no difference between him and Schelling—but that it is eternally accomplishing itself also, that it eternally mediates itself through that absolute consciousness which denies individuality, it is replied that this, too, is only *thought*, only the shadowy fringe of determinate consciousness.

23. It may, accordingly, be asked, does not this argument of a Kantian against Schelling and Hegel press against Vedānta, too? Knowledge, according to Vedānta, is not only different from the knowing activity, it cannot even be described as the (contingent) result of the activity. Its essential character is its eternity, its self-manifestation (*svayam-prakāśatva*). The mental mode, however, in which knowledge manifests itself is contingent, being the result of mental activity. So, too, in the case of such knowledge as leads to *moksha* or 'liberation,' there is first a hearing of the Scriptural texts, a reflecting on them, a refutation of doubts, and a final fixing of the mind on the texts—all this repeated times without number, till the transparency of the mind is secured, and then knowledge shines through and is recognised to have been eternally complete. So, too, the *Moksha* that is reached is taken to be *Brahman* itself, 'unchangingly eternal' (*Kūṭasthānitya*); it is not only quiescence itself: as just passing into it, one feels all the past strife after it to have been utterly illusory, and, what would sound paradoxical, the feeling of illusion itself lapses, there being nothing left but the self shining by itself. Of knowledge, not of *Brahman* only, but of any object, the object is not the cause in any sense. The knowledge, as it shines forth, is felt to shine as it were in free grace. So neither the activity of the self nor the activity of the object can be said to be a *means* to it; as *Sankara* characteristically declares there is no *claim* to knowledge. All this is expressed in another way by saying that perception as an (apparently) processless *accomplished* cognition is *Brahman* or the self itself—of course in the murky atmosphere of sensation which, however, is only *our* limitation. Yet so long as we seek to know this self, this breath of knowledge, as a determinate object, it necessarily eludes our grasp. It is only to be characterised as *n'eti n'eti*, 'not that,' 'not that.'

24. Yet is not this suicidal, one might ask, to call this breath of knowledge the absolute self and yet to deny its positive conceivability? One feels as if the triumph gained over absolute scepticism was more imaginary than real, only a fond hope, not an accomplished reality. But here Vedānta points out that as the objective possibility of 'perception without sensation' and of knowledge of noumenon was demonstrated by dream and dreamless sleep, so the objective possibility (which is here

indistinguishable from actuality) of this undifferentenced consciousness of the absolute lies in a concrete psychological state called the *turīya* or *samādhi* state where this consciousness is isolated and is not a mere fringe of determinate consciousness.

25. The discussion of *sushupti* or dreamless sleep has thus brought us over to the consideration of this *samādhi* or ecstatic consciousness. Waking, dream, and dreamless sleep are intelligible facts easily performing the role of *veræ causæ*, but this *samādhi* seems to explain *obscurum per obscurius*. It accordingly requires an elucidation. In the *sushupti* state, the mind is dissociated wholly from the self which is then in the immediately conscious attitude. It is conscious, but conscious of a blank only. It has then the direct cognition of the absence of specific cognition, the consciousness of a positive nothing, and hence it flashes back on itself. It is the light flashing in circumambient gloom, revealing nothing but the gloom. The *sushupti* state, however, gives the possibility only but not the actuality of the knowledge of noumena; the self does not here swoon into the knowledge of noumena. Like the dream-state, it is a state in which the self has no control over itself, not a state to which the self rises by a continuous effort. So if we could control ourselves in this state, we could promise ourselves the attainment of a far more potent and comprehensive species of knowledge than we could attain even in the actualised dream-state. The progress of knowledge in the waking state might be conceived to be in a line stretching away from us to infinity, and the end is the knowledge of all finite phenomena in their relations to one another. The progress of knowledge in the *actualised* dream-state as distinct from the passive uncontrolled state, is *in* infinity, though the knowledge is still phenomenal; the end here is the knowledge of the infinite of phenomenon getting determined into finites. The progress of knowledge in the *actualised sushupti*-state is from infinite to infinite and not phenomenal. The phenomenal infinite is turned by noumenal screws which are fixed like the axle of a revolving wheel. We may distinguish three stages here (1) the objective possibility of the self being isolated in *sushupti*, (2) the actualised but determinate self-isolation in what has been called *savikalpa-samādhi* or determinate ecstasy, (3) the actualised indeterminate self-isolation in *nirvikalpa-samādhi* or indeterminate ecstasy. These stages are often not distinguished, especially in earlier Vedantic literature. They are all absolute stages where the sense of duality is non-existent.

26. Now what is the difference between *sushupti* and *savikalpa samādhi*? The difference, as ordinarily given, is that in the former the (empirical) mind with all its modes lapses

altogether, whereas in the latter it does not lapse but only gets concentrated into one absolute irrelative mode which thus becomes actualised in the highest degree. The one represents the greatest *dispersion* of attention, the other its utmost *concentration*. In both, the consciousness of duality lapses; in both, the self enjoys undifferented bliss; in both, the timeless seeds of knowledge and action (*vidyā-karma*) persist, accounting for the recognition of the past on awaking from them. But whereas on awaking from *sushupti*, the self remembers that it was in the attitude of knowing object though the object was there a blank, on rising from *sumādhī* it ought to remember it *was* the object in that state and not in the object-knowing attitude at all. In the former, the self as always limited was simply isolated; in the latter, it burst its bonds, destroyed the barrier between subject and object, and became the absolute.

27. The ecstasy, far from being unconsciousness or bare consciousness, is supra-consciousness. If Hegel's 'speculative consciousness' or 'notion' be the truth of discursive understanding, this intellectual or ecstatic intuition of Vedānta is the truth of the speculative consciousness. If Hegel's thought is concrete and creative, it is not so as thought but as reality or being, *i.e.*, as ecstatic identity of thought and being.

28. The method of attaining this ecstasy is not the method of scientific investigation. A phenomenon has not only a relational aspect but also an intrinsic *æsthetic* aspect merging into a mystic aspect. The former aspect is caught by our discursive reason, the latter by imagination which is in fact intuitive reason. Here, too, as in the case of the moral intuition, it has been objected that the notions reached through this imagination are "heuristic rather than determinative" (Kant). But the consideration of the dream-state has already demonstrated the possibility of these notions being isolated and so turned into eternal percepts. This imaginative isolation is effected by prolonged attention. Discursive thought about the relations of an object may no doubt help in this imaginative isolation, for it means a detaining of the aspects of the object in the mind, an oscillation of the mind round it, though it may not always be followed by a definite settling of the mind on it. Generally the mind buzzes round an object, and then moves on to another and then returns to it; and thus if making progress at all, it moves in wider and more complicated figures, but still never effectually settles on any object. While science or philosophy is thus ever and anon *moving* in its figures, with or without a consciousness of the whole, one quite loses sight of the other discipline, *viz.*, that of contemplating an individual object, of getting glued down to it, of sinking into the heart of it, by

suppressing within us the urgency of distracting desires and the subtle caprices of thought, and by tranquilising the surface of the mind while holding before it a symbol of the object we are seeking to know, instead of struggling to catch the object with a self-stultifying eagerness.

29. There are different grades of noumena (*devatā*) which the self may realise in ecstasy. From the ecstatic intuition of all other determinate objects, there is waking; but there is no waking from the ecstatic intuition of God, for the simple reason that so long as there is limitation or the slightest trace of individuality, there can be no intuition of this Infinite Determination, no becoming infinite. This is the highest stage of *savikalpa-samādhi*. The mind-capsule of the self, persisting in all such *samādhi*, and ever expanding, reaches here its utmost tension and utmost tenuity. This perfectly transparent envelope still constitutes the determinateness of God as *Isvara*. He is the actualised 'Ideal of Pure Reason' of Kant, the 'Absolute Idea' of Hegel, self-realised not in thought but in ecstasy. Although, said Kant, this is the most adequate reason-picture of the thing-in-itself, the thing-in-itself is the real, negating even this picture; of the thing-in-itself, as Spencer would have put it, there is only an indeterminate consciousness, an 'indefinable sense.' Vedanta's addition to this is the suggestion that both the reason-picture and the indeterminate consciousness are capable of being isolated and actualised in the concrete states, *savikalpa samādhi* (intuition of determinate noumena), and *nirvikalpa samādhi* (intuition of the reality transcending all determinateness). The latter is undifferentiated not only in the sense that the consciousness of duality is absent, as it is even in *sushupti*, not only in the sense that the unconscious ring of the Unknown constituting the limitation of all noumena lower than God is removed, as it may be in *savikalpa samādhi*, but also in the sense that even the consciousness of this removal is absent. This is the highest stage, this is the truth, this is *Brahman*.

30. Waking, dream, dreamless sleep, and ecstasy with the intermediate stages constitute, then, a *new dimension* of the mind. This is not only a dimension of the mind but the one dimension of existence in which even the deepest of all distinctions, *viz.*, that between the subject and object, has place. The ordinarily conceived duality between them gives place in Vedanta to the conception of a gradation of existences, one pole of which is the lowest waking stage in which the self completely forgets itself, the stage of the mere object, and the other pole, the ecstatic stage in which the self not only denies the existence of everything else but denies the denial itself, the stage of the pure

subject. The gradation is not eternally spread out ; the *samādhi* state is not only a stage among stages, it is the truth of the other stages. So, too, in the series, each stage is the truth of the preceding stage. The gradation between subject and object is also the gradation between truth and untruth, between good and evil. The self, as identified with any stage, feels the stage below it to be illusory ; thus there is a reconciliation between the absolute distinction of truth and untruth on the one hand, and the continuous gradations of truth on the other. The final duality of *Brahman* and *Avidyā* (illusion) which at the same time is no duality of positives, is the exemplar of the relation between truth and untruth.

31. It remains to recognise the fact that each stage is not only present in its isolation but also unconsciously informs the lower stage. In fact on the waking plane we can trace the projections of all the other planes. Psychology recognises the stages, perception, imagination (reproductive and productive), thought (understanding) with the explicit consciousness of subject and object, and the indefinable consciousness of the beyond (Spencer). Now the last three, as we have pointed out, might be regarded as the projections of dream, dreamless sleep, and ecstasy on the waking plane. Of these, the earlier stages adumbrate the later, and the later react on the earlier. This is the empirical counterpart of Kant's *a priori* psychology. In the perception of object, there is the given matter of the sensations, fitted, partly as reproduced ideas, into the forms of space and time (generated, it may be, out of ideas), this time again shooting forth the rays of productive imagination, the schemata, to touch the categories, the eyes of the self or the synthetic unity of apperception ; this self all the while feels the pressure of the thing-in-itself and so thinks the object under the form of infinity, *i.e.*, in relation to the infinite world, to the subject, and the *ens realissimum*, still failing, however, to catch the thing-in-itself and having only a contentless aspiration towards it. Vedantism finds the concretes of these *a priori* elements, which all operate in waking perception, in the distinguishable internal characters of the several stages, waking, dreaming, etc. The general correspondence between the Vedantic stages and the Kantian elements has been sufficiently made out ; a more detailed correspondence can be exhibited only after a modified presentation of Kantianism. This, however, space will not permit.

II.—Vedantic Metaphysics.

32. The position of the pure subject and the material object in the Vedantic system has been indicated. The primary duality of self and negation, which is no duality of positives, has been found to transfigure every stage of existence. As a consequence of this unconscious transfiguration, each stage in the series, waking, dream, etc., in its unconscious form, becomes *co-ordinate* with the lower stage. This is particularly apparent in the waking stage where the distinctions among the several aspects of existence, *adhyātma*, *adhibhūta*, *adhideva*, *adhiloka*, etc., come out explicitly as co-ordinate with each other. These distinctions are intelligible only in the light of a metaphysical view which is dimly traceable in the *Upanishads* and which can hardly be said to have been completely brought out even by the commentators. The exposition of it, to be attempted presently, would therefore require to be justified by an elaborate discussion of all passages in the *Upanishads* which lend colour to it. For the present it is set forth only as a hypothesis.

33. In the waking stage, the sentient body is the *adhyātma* or subjective aspect, and the objects of sense-experience constitute the *adhibhūta* or objective aspect. They are so distinct here that language is strained in calling them *aspects* of the same thing. But they are related to one another. The self as identified with the body takes the object to be 'useful,' to be subservient to its pleasure and pain. The experience of the object rouses desire, desire again begets experience—a restless whirl of relation. In the æsthetic consciousness, however, such as is roused in rapt contemplation or *upāsana*, one rises to a universal standpoint from which is witnessed the *identity* of the different sentient elements of the body with the different aspects of the object. The restless relations, the attractions and repulsions between the body and the object, are then felt to be illusory differentiations of quiescent unities. The eye and the visible aspect of things, for example, constitute a unity. The *Upanishads* bristle with æsthetic intuitions of such unities, ranging from the most profound to the most superficial, viewed as *devatās* or objects for *upāsana*. This *upāsana* consists in a *continuous* direction of the attention to an æsthetic symbol revealed by the *śāstras*, *i.e.*, by some seer. The attitude in it is quite the reverse of the attitude of that cheap rationalism which makes a parade of its independence of authority; the

existence of the *devatā* or the aspect of the object worshipped may not have been proved by reason or may not have at once appealed to one's leaden æsthetic sensibility, but through the will to believe or *śraddhā*, through prolonged contemplation, the *devatā* may be seen to be gradually shining out.

34. The *adhideva* aspect is to be understood in relation to the *adhiloka* aspect, which requires an elucidation. Every *devatā* demands a *loka*. Psychologically put, an absolute unity, to be real, must be not only thought but realised in some sort of *intuition*. In æsthetic (visual) intuition, for example, we realise a *devatā*, like the sun, the unity of seeing and the visible world. Now as here the realised object ceases to be an object and gets manifested as the absolute identity that it eternally was, though unrecognised because of the individual's limitations, so the intuition, too, is divested of its merely subjective aspect and appears as an eternal shining world (*div*) with which the limited subject is raised to identity. The distinction between the subject and object in ordinary knowledge appears in the absolute sphere as a distinction between *loka* and *devatā*. Only in ordinary knowledge, the subject takes the lead, whereas here the *devatā*, which corresponds to the object, is the higher reality. What is from the lower standpoint *my* intuition of an object is from the higher standpoint, a *devatā* shining, revealing himself in a *loka*.

35. It may be urged, however, that the distinction between subject and object is altogether annulled in the absolute sphere and therefore a *devatā* must be conceived to shine by itself. The demand for a locus for such intelligible entities springs from a feebleness of the mind which will have sensuous symbols where it ought to entertain pure concepts of the reason; it springs in fact from that hypostatising tendency with which Plato has been charged with regard to his Ideas.

36. To this it is replied that an existence that is nowhere is unintelligible and that the demand for a locus even in the sensuous sphere springs from a necessity of the reason. The locus of an extended object involves the conception of the *attribute* of extension (which is nothing but the whole of space) being in space. The sensuous conception of an object in space would thus be utterly unintelligible *unless a relation be conceived to be dual—a being and a process*—the being transcending the process and yet resting on the process.

37. This necessity of the reason applies not only to such a sensuous relation, it applies to the highest relation, the relation of subject and object. To Absolute Idealism, the Self is the absolute identity of subject and object. It is self-relation, the being and the relation being here identical; and so for it as

self-existent, it might be deemed absurd to demand any *locus* or external relation. To this, Vedānta will reply that such an absolute or irrelative reality *is*, or is realisable only in, an ecstatic consciousness (which Hegel does not admit) and that to us who have not reached it, who only *think* of it, this has to be thought of as resting on the relation to an individual. To ecstatic consciousness, such relation is not; but mere thought has to postulate a dual absolute—the absolute for the absolute consciousness as resting on the absolute for the individual, the unknowable absolute on the knowable absolute. The self that excludes the object as absolute negation is at once the same as and higher than the self that has the negation within it as a moment. If the self be but relation, as Hegel takes it, it must be taken to depend on the *nature* or the limitation of the terms of the relation; even in the self-relation of the self, the selfs that are related to each other are bounded by negation and hence their relation cannot be wholly free. If it be said that the relation is prior in reality, that it is the universal which freely particularises itself, it is replied that such a particularising is inexplicable in the last resort and therefore the universal that is in and through particulars is a *fact* to be accepted, not a free function of the reason. The last principle of philosophy for us must be a *necessity* of the reason founded on a *given fact*, though the aspiration of philosophy must ever be to reach a principle that is wholly rational. Brahman, the self-existent, must therefore be conceived by us to rest on His own glory (*sve mahimni tisthati*). So lower down, every *devatā* is to be conceived to be in a *loka*.

38. The necessity of the several aspects, *adhyātma*, etc., has been vindicated at what might appear to be a disproportionate length, were it not for the fact that these are just the conceptions which require to be raised above the mythologic region in which they are supposed to be. Given a *loka* or intuition-ground, we have against it a *devatā* or an absolute unity of subject and object. A concrete intuition-medium, a Platonic heaven is necessary to ensure to these *devatās* or Ideas reality. It will not do to say that they exist in thought or reason: that appears from the waking standpoint to be too thin to support reality.

39. The doctrine of *adhyātma*, etc., is thus capable of being affiliated on Absolute Idealism, as modified by Vedantic transcendentalism. The *devatās* have the character of absolute identities but do they resemble the Platonic Ideas in being *universalia ante rem*? Is the Vedantic view one of (conceptual) realism? The fact that Schopenhauer's view finds room for the eternal ideas, the grades of the objectification of the will,

encourages us to look forward to something like them in Vedānta.

40. A *devatā* is differentiated transversely into *adhyātma* and *adhibhūta*, but is it also longitudinally differentiated into particular individuals? It would appear to be so, for a *devatā* like the sun is said to be the unity of the senses of sight supposed to be severally possessed by different persons and of the visible aspects of things. There is an instructive difference in this respect between Vedānta and Sāṅkhya; according to the latter, each sense, as sense, *i.e.*, as *adhyātma*, is one, and different souls partake (by reflection) of this one sense; but according to the former, a sense as sense is many, being different in different individuals, but then these many are only the illusory differentiations of one *devatā* which corresponds to the particular sense. (The difference is explained by the Sāṅkhya view that the individual soul is real and that there is no such thing as one cosmic illusion but only individual illusions of separate eyes, separate minds, etc., there being one real *prakṛiti* which eternally and really evolves into *mahat*, etc., including the archetypal senses. The Vedāntic view is that this *prakṛiti* is but *Māyā* or cosmic illusion, and that therefore not only the individual illusions but also the *archetypal* senses and the correlated primal matters are but its differentiations). In any case, the many particular senses of sight and the many visible aspects of things are said to find their unity in the Sun-deity.

41. But still this would be *aspect*-realism rather than true class-realism. The aspects, visibility, audibility, etc., have their Ideas, concrete basal *devatās* as they might be called, but are not these only superficial aspects of things? What of the natural kinds like man, gold, etc.? Have not they, too, their Ideas? Vedānta, while admitting that not only the class but every individual has got its eternal 'name and form' (*nāma-rūpa*), will demur at first to an implication of the objection. These sense-aspects in Vedānta are the *primal matters*, the absolutes of the senses, hearing, touch, sight, taste, and smell. They constitute no superficial aspect but the central substance, and 'names and forms' are but the illusory differentiations of this substance. When, by means like *upāsāna*, we have risen to the absolute consciousness in the waking state, these external sensuous aspects are viewed as the basal *devatās* (they themselves are the illusory differentiations of still higher, more substantial realities, as we shall see presently); they are viewed as the substance (relatively speaking) of the object of which the form (taken in its widest sense) is only the manifestation or illusory differentiation. Within the form, there are again relations of matter and form, for each stage of the form is matter in relation

to a further differentiation of it. Now each of these stages is capable of being actualised into *devatās* by ecstatic contemplation. Now when a rationalist takes the sensation to be lapsed thought or thought become unconscious, and when an empiricist holds that our thoughts are only the complex manufactures out of sense-material, by themselves only illusory refinements and useful only in reference to sense-reality, their antagonism is transcended by the Vedantist who reinstates both by pointing out that without an absolute intuition-continuum, the thought cannot be real and that the *devatā* is therefore the sense reality, divested of its limitation of unconsciousness.

42. These *devatās* again have an order among them—an order really of emanation but capable also of being viewed as of evolution from the human standpoint—the absolutely formless indeterminate matter being one pole, and the full-blown waking reality the other pole. We may notice two orders of differences, the one comprising the several grades of matter, the other comprising the forms as manifested in each grade. Yet the grades themselves are formed or determinate matter. The same (formless) matter *persists* through all the grades in all the forms ; so, too, each formed matter persists in its differentiations in the grades below it, the grades corresponding to dreamless sleep, dream, etc., the successive materialisations of the same reality. This then is the difference between ordinary realism and Vedantic realism : the Ideas are not only concrete universals but *substantial matters* of different grades from the pure subject to the grossest material object. The pure subject is the formless matter, the sole reality, the truth of the grades of materialisation, and of all the determinate objects therein. The full-blown reality *minus* this formless matter is absolute negation, the very principle of illusion. Yet what are the multitudinous ‘names and forms’ of this full-blown reality ? These empty husks of reality are not reality : but they get filled in with the formless matter. Why does the reality enter these unreal forms ? It shows that these forms are neither real nor unreal. Such a contradictory thing can only be the principle of illusion : it is darkness only that can be at once revealed and destroyed by light. This is the famous principle of *Māyā*, which is one yet manifold, the matrix of all ‘names and forms.’ These, too, must be eternal, coeternal with the pure subject. Yet this does not necessarily argue a despair of explanation. Of the forms which constitute individuality, no explanation is possible except that illusion is at its root. No universal can exhaust the infinite variety of the individual. If even we could trace a consecutive differentiation from the highest universal downwards, each step of the differentiation would be unintelligible. It is the very

essence of differentiation to escape the universal. To recognise the necessity of this unknowability is to recognise the principle of *māyā*.

43. Not that universals among these shadowy names and forms, concatenating them, are unknown in Vedānta. The realistic *jāti* or universal is admitted both in *Nyāya* and Vedānta, though the latter emphatically disclaims the abstract denotational *jāti* of the former. According to *Nyāya*, this *jāti* is an eternal reality, the *vyakti* or individual things inhering in it and being eternally connected with it. Vedānta denies both its eternal reality and its being co-ordinate with individual things. As has been already indicated, to Vedānta nothing is an eternal reality except the pure self. As to the other point, if an individual and its *jāti* be taken to be distinct (and co-ordinate in reality), they cannot be unified in any way. The inherence, according to Vedānta, is a fiction. (This recalls the famous criticism of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas by Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics*. In 'A is B,' if B the concept is distinct from A, their copular relation is a fiction; for it is asked, what connects A or B with the relation? If another relation, what connects that with its members? And so there is a regress to infinity. Once you set up two utterly distinct things, you cannot bridge over the gulf; only you may pronounce the effort to combine to be itself illusory. Without an admission of identity-in-difference, not only this inherence, but also any kind of connexion, even space-connexion, would be inconceivable. What view, then, does Vedānta itself hold? It understands the *jāti*, not as the denotational real but as the connotational real (*atārānugato dharmah*), not as co-ordinate with and distinct from the *vyakti* or individual, but *identical* with it on the one hand and of a different grade of reality on the other. The identity between attribute and substance (*Dharma-Dharmin*) is characteristic of the hylozoistic speculations of Vedānta and Sāṅkhya (regarding *māyā* which is one yet many, or regarding *prakṛiti* which really evolves), following logically on the denial of inherence as a relation. This *Dharma* or attribute is again the essence, the persisting matter in relation to the *Dharmin* or thing, infinite in every individual, having the whole of the phenomenality behind it.

44. Vedānta might very well admit the co-ordinateness of *jāti* and *vyakti* in the sphere of the pure 'names and forms,' that realm of shadows. The relation between *jāti* and *vyakti*, which has already been discussed, is in the region of formed matter where the more differentiated is less in reality. The realm of shadows or *māyā* may be compared to space, the principle of separation or 'spread-out-ness,' the nearest

determinate symbol of the principle of difference, in which a mode may be said to be different from another in which it is included.

45. We have thus to recognise three systems of eternal entities in Vedānta: (1) in regard to matter, formless matter and its several emanatory grades corresponding to the stages, *samādhi*, *sushupti*, etc., including the intermediaries; (2) in regard to formed matter, the basal *devatās*, corresponding to the primal matters, and also the essences like 'cow-ness,' 'horse-ness' (*gotva*, *asvatva*) incarnated in the above grades; (3) in regard to the 'names and forms,' the abstract differences, which are neither real nor unreal. We have still to recognise two other orders, (4) the *Karma*-unities or will-unities in the several grades, and (5) the universal unities of these with their cosmic reactions, the universal emanations of Brahman, including the lesser gods, the inquiry into which is for the present postponed.

46. Lest the identity-in-difference implied in Vedantic realism be taken to be an unwarranted importation of Hegelianism, it is necessary to refer to discussions bearing on the law of contradiction in Vedantic philosophy. It may be noted at the outset that in this Vedantic conception of identity-in-difference, as distinct from a similar conception in Hegel, the identity is the truth and the difference is illusory and even the negation of the difference through which the identity is affirmed is illusory. In connexion with the discussion of illusory perception, as of the nacre taken for silver, the point is raised: when the appearance of the silver is corrected and the nacre in its real nature known, can it not be held that the thing is *sometimes* silver and *sometimes* nacre? The reply given is that it is the very nature of the later or correcting perception to deny the truth of the former perception once for all. When the illusion of silver ceases, one is not conscious of the real silver being absent but only of the illusory silver having disappeared. But a further difficulty may be raised: when the silver is known to be illusory, is not the knowledge itself self-contradictory, as expressible in the form 'the (existent) silver is non-existent'? The reply is, the knowledge is rather expressible in the form, 'the illusory silver is absent.' The very perception of the illusory character of a thing is the perception of the illusory thing being absent: to light up the darkness is to destroy it. The question really is, if illusion is known through contradiction, is not contradiction itself conceivable? The Vedantic reply appears to be that the contradicting perception completely destroys the phenomenal reality of the contradicted percept. The contradiction is therefore not real; we have really two cognitions here, (a) *this* phenomenally real silver, (b) *that* illusory silver is

absent. The cognition of this phenomenally real silver, *plus* the contradicting percept of the nacre amounts to the cognition of the illusory silver being absent. In identity of contradictories, the identity is known through recognition : the relation of identity is nothing but the identical thing. The union of contradictories is uncritically accepted at first, only to be rejected when it is known to be a union of contradictories. This view of illusory perception is only the reappearance in a lower plane of the dualism of *Brahman* and *māyā* which yet is no dualism of positives.

47. In this connexion, we may refer to a discussion of *Sankara* in his commentary on *Bṛihad-āraṇyaka Upanishad* V-i, where he combats *Bhartri-prajña*'s views of Brahman being at once one and dual (*dvaita-advaita*, the causal Brahman different from the effect Brahman, though identical at the retraction of the world). *Sankara* argues that although rules of action may admit of exceptions or alternatives, a truth does not ; truth does not depend on any one's choice. Two contradictory attributes, *dvaita* and *advaita*, dual and single, cannot both be true of the same thing. Yet the sea and its waves are said to be identical-in-difference. In fact the union of contradictories is not denied of phenomenal objects, it is denied only of the noumenon, the 'simple' eternal object (*nitya-niravayava-vastu-vishayam hi viruddhatvam avocāma dvaitādvaitasya na kārya-vishaye sāvayave*). Does not this remind one of Herbart's criticism of Hegel, that the union of contradictories is only an empiricism ? The Vedantic doctrine of *adbhikāri-bheda* (accommodation), that the truth to be taught must be relative to the students' capacities or qualifications, is not only a practical principle of pedagogy, secular and religious—it is founded on an epistemological truth. The duality of Brahman and the world is true to one steeped in desires, and encased in individuality ; their unity is true to one who has come to *know*, to transcend individuality. Truth is relative to the knower. This, however, is no Protagorean subjectivism. So long as the individual is an individual, there is duality between teacher and taught, the teaching appearing to be something foreign, imposed from without ; but when there is a flashing from below, there is one homogeneous flame of *advaita-jñāna* or monistic knowledge, when, however, the individual does not remain an individual to recognise the contradiction between it and the previous *dvaita-jñāna* or dualistic knowledge. To us, from the outside, *dvaita* and *advaita* are both true, as possible stages of knowledge, but *dvaita* is inferior in reality to *advaita* ; they are not co-ordinate. In every act of knowledge, the duality between subject and object presents itself only to give way to their identification.

48. It may be urged against the foregoing account of Vedantic realism that it does not provide for a principle of *change*, as distinct from one of mere difference, whether change is regarded as emanation (*vivarta*) or as evolution (*pariṇāma*). The three orders of eternal entities which we have recognised are all static ; where is the dynamic principle ?

49. One would imagine such a principle is likely to be met with in a discussion of causality. Referring, however, to an elaborate and acute discussion of the subject in *Sankara's* commentary on *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* I, ii, we find only a clearer enunciation of the static view of the world which we have already presented, but the dynamic principle appears to be nowhere. It would not be, however, quite out of place here to present, in a slightly modern garb, the salient features of *Sankara's* argument, both as a specimen of his reasoning and as a further explication of the foregoing views.

50. Before the world began, no difference was manifest ; everything was shrouded by death. Not that there was a mere void, for then causes and effects were in their seminal unmanifested condition. (To justify this, he proves first that the cause, meaning by it only material cause, and next that the effect, meaning by it the effect-form, are eternally existent.) (1) *Eternity of cause*. That effects are possible only when the causes are present is a matter of experience. It might be objected that when a pot is fashioned out of a lump of clay, the lump is first destroyed and then the pot comes into being and so the cause is not immediately antecedent to the effect. But it is replied that not the lump-form but the clay is the cause. All causes in their causation destroy their previous manifestation in introducing their present manifestation, for the same cause cannot exist in two different forms at the same time. But the cessation of the previous manifestation does not mean the cessation of the cause itself. Yet why not take the lump-form also to be a cause, seeing that the clay cannot exist except in some form ? Because the form is variable but the matter is persistent. But still must it not have some form ? No : in the production of the pot, the clay for a moment has left the lump-form and is passing over to the pot-form. (That is the *mystery* of production. Change means the conflict of manifestation and the consequent momentary *nakedness* of the substance.) But is this naked substance perceived ? May it not be that the lump of clay only *resembles* the pot that is made out of it without the clay persisting identically in the change ? No ; the identity is *perceived* but the similarity is only *inferred*. Inference is based on perception, and if perception were to be questioned by inference here, there would be an illicit regress to infinity.

The denial of identity would mean the rapid succession of momentary acts, which means the denial of knowledge of any object. For where is the evidence for the object? If in another act of knowledge, where is the evidence for this again? And so on. Similarly if you do not trust in your immediate perception of identity and ask 'what is the evidence for it' and reply because there is the felt similarity, you must ask for the evidence for that again, and so on, which means that you cannot *affirm* anything. Besides, the consciousness 'this is like that' is possible if the same self or knower is present to both the momentary cognitions, 'this' and 'that,' which, however, cannot be admitted by one who denies identity. Is it replied that whether there be a self or not, the likeness is a feeling (itself an event of the mind)? But it is no blind feeling; 'this' and 'that' refer to each other; it is an objective assertion. If it were only a subjective feeling, 'this' and 'that' also, being individually known by assimilation with their likes would be merely subjective, false; and then the knowledge of this subjectivity or falsity would itself be merely subjective or false. (Such a sceptical suicide then is the only alternative to the view that the cause is perceived to be persisting self-identically in the effect.) (2) *Eternity of effect.* The effect-form, too, does not accidentally emerge into existence but is eternally existent. (i) As an object hidden under darkness or behind an opaque wall manifests itself when a lamp is lighted or when the wall is removed, so is the form of the pot hidden under the previous form of the clay, the lump-form, and is manifested when the previous form is removed by appropriate means. *Objections* :—(a) In order to prove that all that is manifested was previously existent, it is necessary to know that what was previously non-existent is not manifested, but the absence of manifestation cannot be perceived. Hence it can only be said that a thing is existent when manifested. *Reply* :—It cannot be held either that it is existent *only* when manifested, for that amounts to saying that all existents are manifested, which, however, is not true. (b) The previous form, lump-form, as agent producing manifestation, is different in nature from the darkness or the opaque wall; for the wall occupies a space-position distinct from that of the object hidden by it, but the lump-form does not do so. *Reply* :—This difference is not important; in milk, the milk-form prevents the manifestation of the water-form and yet occupies the same position as the latter. (c) But there is another difference: to *see* the pot hidden under darkness, one has to make an exertion (light a lamp, etc.), but to *see* the pot emerging from the lump of clay, no such exertion is required (though it is required in the production of it). *Reply* :—In both cases, to see does not require any exertion:

the exertion put forth is for production only—in the former case for investing the pot with the attribute of lightedness, in the latter case, for destroying the lump-form, etc.

(ii) The past being or the future being of an object may be peculiarly distinct from the present being, but it is still being. Knowledge of the future is knowledge of some *existent* object, for otherwise how is the future *willed*? Willing (as distinct from merely desiring) means directly an objectification of the future. The *Yogin* in his clairvoyance is said to *see* the past and the future as we see the present. Besides God's foreknowledge would be meaningless, if the future object were not eternally existent (*cf.* Anselm's reconciliation between divine foreknowledge and man's free will). (Existence or reality immediately means 'transcending time.') Again, what does non-existence of the future object, 'pot,' mean? Only that some other object is now present. Non-existence of pot itself is not existent positively: it is not defined by being distinguished from other non-existences, as that of the cloth. And what is non-existence *of* pot? Is non-existence an attribute of pot? Then it means non-existence of non-existent pot, not of the positive pot. Finally, if we say, 'A is produced or comes into being,' A, the subject, must be already existent in order to have the predicate, 'comes into being'?

51. This elaborate discussion of causality leads to the recognition of Brahman as the material cause of the universe and of the primal hiding principle, co-eternal with Brahman, *viz.*, *māyā* which by itself is nothing, like the blue tint which seems to pervade objects viewed through blue glasses. Still therefore the dynamic principle remains undiscovered.

52. What is *śakti* or power? It is sometimes identified with the principle of illusion or *māyā*. In *Panchadaśī*, for example (Chapter II, slokas 42 seq.), we have pronouncements to the following effect:—*māyā*, or the power of the Lord, is no reality (in the presence of Brahman), is inferrible from its effects, and only from these. The power of the Existent is not the Existent, even as the power of the fire is not the fire. What, then, is it apart from the Existent? It cannot be called the void, as that is taken to be the effect of *māyā*; it is something then which is neither the void nor the existent. Yet it exists only as through the Existent, for substance and attribute are not separate entities. It may, no doubt, be manifested in effects, but before creation, such manifested power did not exist, and so power cannot be a principle separate from Brahman. (Yet to show that Brahman transcends it, it is added) this power does not pervade all Brahman but only a portion or aspect of Him (it). This Universe is only a quarter of Him; full three-

quarters are self-luminous. So in *Bhagavad-gītā*, Krishna says, 'By a portion of myself, do I pervade the Universe.' So too *Sruti*, 'Having pervaded the universe, He extends a space beyond' (*atyatishṭhaś daśāṅgulam*); and there is the *Vedānta-Sūtra*, 'Also there is a form of the Lord not abiding in effected things' (Thibaut's translation). (It is admitted, however, that this attribution of parts to the Indiscernible is only provisional). 'That power, as residing in the Existent, produces effects.' The power that creates *ākāśa* (space or ether, its first effect) creates also its identity with the Existent and thus (in the inverse order) makes the existent an attribute of *ākāśa* as substance. It is really the Existent that becomes *ākāśa*: to take the existence as of *ākāśa* is what might be expected of *māyā* or the principle of illusion.

53. We have to note four points in the above passage:—(1) that this *power*, by itself, is only *māyā*; (2) that it exists and functions only as residing in Brahman, *i.e.*, only as Brahman informing *māyā*; (3) that though thus informed, it is transcended by Brahman; and (4) that Brahman existing in the power becomes the effect: the effect is thus *not* non-existent. The passage presents both sides of the Vedantic doctrine of *māyā*—the world being unreal apart from Brahman and real in the reality of Brahman. The latter side is frequently overlooked.

54. Power then as existent is the Existent assuming forms, *i.e.*, making the unreal real. The One Existent Blissful Intelligence, entering *māyā*, becomes self-dirempted into *Isvara* and *aparā-prakṛiti*, *i.e.*, the Determinate God and the 'object-in-general,' the primordial matter in which God is to energise. Brahman against the 'dark ground' of *māyā* is *Isvara*, *māyā* against the light of the self is *aparā-prakṛiti*. Yet *Isvara* is said to be *free*, to be related to the dark ground, yet floating on it, to have conquered it once for all, employing it 'only as a servant.' This attribute of freely relating Himself to the dark ground, being itself absolute (for in Him attributes and aspects are concrete realities), is to be viewed as an entity by itself, *viz.*, as *parā-prakṛiti*, and the *nīśus* of this again towards *aparā-prakṛiti* is to be taken as a third entity *śakti*, or power of the Lord.

55. This *parā-prakṛiti* is the intelligence of *Isvara*, appearing in its determinate form only as reflected from the *aparā*. As Brahman, the undifferented intelligence, shines on this *māyā*, it turns it into an object and forthwith becomes the Determinate Subject of this object, functioning towards the object. This triply stratified *Māyā* with the reflection of the Lord, *viz.*, as comprising *parā-prakṛiti*, *śakti* of the Lord, and *aparā-prakṛiti*, may be considered to be the concrete archetype of the abstrac-

tions, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* (light, intelligence, or goodness ; activity ; darkness, insentientcy, heaviness, evil), those universal aspects of existence, to understand which is to understand the differential genius of Hinduism itself. Conformably to the general trend of Vedantism, one would expect a projection of *parā-prakṛiti* and *śakti* on *aparā-prakṛiti* : thus *aparā-prakṛiti* is of the three *guṇas* (attributes, elements), *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, all compact. The Sankhya principle *Pradhāna*, is this *aparā-prakṛiti*, a stage more determinate than mere *māyā*, differing from it much as Aristotle's matter as potentiality differs from Plato's *me on*, the negation-soil in which he plants his Ideas. Sankhya, however, takes it to be an ultimate reality incapable of being derived from higher principles.

56. The *parā-prakṛiti* has been taken to be the determinate intelligence (*buddhi*) of the Lord, but it should be noticed that this *buddhi* is also taken to be an evolute of the *aparā-prakṛiti*, in fact its first and most perfect evolute. So we have to understand the *parā* as the *buddhi* in its subject-aspect, i.e., as informed with Brahman ; the other *buddhi* is its passive aspect, its object aspect, for active *buddhi* knows passive *buddhi*, as the eye sees light. But what is this *buddhi*, active and passive, as distinct from Brahman ? Here an understanding of the psychology of the faculties recognised in Vedanta, viz., *buddhi*, *manas*, *ahankāra*, and *chitta* is necessary.

57. All knowledge is self-affirmation. The Vedantic self is as we have seen already, beyond this self-affirmation, something transcending determination, the indeterminate, the unknown and unknowable, that which being presupposed in all knowledge is incapable of being caught in any determinate mode of knowledge. This determinate self-affirmation, too, as (eternally) *completed* or *accomplished*, is beyond the self-affirming activity. This activity implies the consciousness of a limited, unrealised agent proceeding or functioning towards an object. The consciousness of such a limited agent or subject as (illusorily) identified with the self (which is really *absolute*, not only in the sense of being above duality but above all determination also) is what Kant calls empirical self-consciousness. This activity itself is to be conceived as manifested in two grades, the intellectual and sensory, the synthesis of concepts and the synthesis of apprehension. The self is manifested in self-affirmation or knowledge ; knowledge is manifested by the self-affirming activity of the self-conscious individualised self ; the activity is that of the interpretation of the sense-manifold, given as *one* apprehension. The relation of the senses to the objects will be discussed later on. The senses are only blind receivers and incapable of being themselves perceived (*atindriya*). The essen-

tial character of the four faculties of *antah-karāṇa* here discussed—*manas*, *chitta*, etc. (*manas* in its widest sense comprising all the four) is that they have both spontaneity and receptivity and are capable of being self-perceived. *Manas* in the narrower sense is the faculty of simple *apprehension* (not a mere *sense*). It has for its specific function, *samśaya* (doubt), *samkalpa* and *vikalpa* (assertion and negation, intellectual or conative). These functions, so widely different, are capable of being connected with one another. As an organ of simple apprehension, *manas* just raises the question, 'what is it' (sensation), but answers it not, just gives a start to attention; so its function on the intellectual side is to doubt. *Samkalpa* is mental impulse (*mānasa karma*), conation as it appears in desire or motor impulse, in attention, even in objectification. This blind spontaneity is essentially that element in an assertion which goes out beyond the mere judgment, the element of free will in intellection to which Descartes attributed error. *Vikalpa* is just the negation of this *samkalpa*, a mental impasse, attention as homeless, not as fixing itself on an object but as moving away from it or in its transition from one object to another, will in the air, appearing as aversion, hesitation, doubt or as consciousness of difference, the stress of the will in and beyond the negative judgment. *Chitta* is the faculty of intellectual synthesis as distinct from mere apprehension, intellectual, in a wide sense including *smaraṇa* (remembering), *anusandhāna* (inquiring, seeking to know *what*), etc. *Chitta* thus is intellectual *pravṛtti* or self-affirming activity directed outwards, *i.e.*, towards the object; the consciousness which is directed inwards, *i.e.*, the consciousness of self as agent or subject being *ahamkāra*. *Buddhi* is the faculty of knowledge (as distinct from knowing), intellectual synthesis (*nischaya* or *adhyavasāya*) not as activity but as an eternally accomplished (*pratinishthita*) affair, the unquestioning, quiescent self-affirmation in the copula of a judgment, in belief, in the feelings of pleasure and pain. The relation of knowing to knowledge is peculiar; the latter is manifested, eternally accomplished, not effected as a contingent product or result. In knowledge, however, two elements may be distinguished, the *vṛtti* or mental mode (section 88), and the light of *chit* or self playing on it and investing it with its timeless or eternal character. The former can be described as the result of the knowing activity, of the ripening of the seeds of *vidyā-karma* or the *samskāras*; and so *buddhi* or *mahat* in this aspect—the completed organism of knowledge—has been sometimes described as the *adhibhūta* aspect of *chitta*, the knowing activity, which is thus the corresponding *adhyātma* or limited subjective aspect. *Buddhi* then as the faculty of determinate knowledge is the immediate home

of the self, which is the light of *knowledge* transcending all determination and yet transfiguring all determinate mental modes.

58. This *buddhi* is either the immediate reflector of the self or the immediate envelope or body of the self. As reflector or object, it is the finest evolute of *aparā-prakṛiti*. As the body with which the self is identified, it is *parā-prakṛiti*. The two *prakṛitis*, therefore, interpenetrate one another ; they have been described as the primal male and female principles, a division which appears at different stages in Hindu cosmogony but does not, therefore, necessarily involve confusion of thought. The light of the self not only gets reflected from the surface of *māyā*, turning it into *aparā-prakṛiti*, it transfigures *māyā* in all its strata, everywhere differentiating it into *sattva* and *tamas*, itself getting next identified with the *sattva* and then functioning (*rajas*) towards the *tamas*. Thus it is that the *sattva* aspect of *aparā-prakṛiti* is at the same time the *adhyātma* or subjective aspect, *tamas* being the *adhibhūta* or objective aspect. One is tempted to identify this distinction between *sāttvika* and *tāmasika* in Vedānta with the distinction between actual and potential in the Aristotelian system ; there is a good deal of agreement, too, between the systems in respect of the connected doctrines, viz., that matter is unredeemed potentiality, that the soul is the entelechy of the body, and that God is *noesis noeseus*, the purest actuality (cf. *Īśvara* having the transparent garment, *buddha-sattva-upādhi* of *buddhi*). But it must be remembered that whereas all the differentiation is taken to be ultimately real by Aristotle, Vedānta takes it to be real only within the sphere of *māyā* or illusion. In fact, as has already been pointed out, Aristotle's matter is *aparā-prakṛiti* but not *māyā* ; and although he recognises that there are different grades of reality, that actuality is the truth of potentiality, and that God though pure actuality still contains in Himself ideally all potentiality, yet he does not rise to the conception of Brahman to whom 'being the truth or actuality of anything' is itself an *upādhi* or envelope, who is absolute in being devoid not only of all external relation but also of all internal relation, who is said to be *ekamevādvyūṭyam*, one without a second, transcending *svagata-bheda* (having parts), *sajātiya-bheda* (having something similar), and *vijātiya-bheda* (having something different from it). He rises as far as the Vedāntic *Īśvara*, the first emanation of Brahman. Brahman in the attitude of creation. This *Īśvara*, though the determinate God as distinct from the indeterminate Brahman, is still undifferentiated within Himself. This follows from the very nature of *buddhi*, which is pure self-affirmation, which is distinct alike from pure *chaitanya* on the one hand, and from *chitta* and

ahamkāra on the other. This *buddhi* has been identified with the state of the self as in *sushupti*, or better still, as in *savikalpa-samādhi* which is its actualised state. Yet *buddhi* is not an abstract state but rather the concrete faculty or body in which the self is inclosed. The undifferentiated character of *buddhi* appears still more explicitly when we consider that it is the faculty of feeling pleasure and pain, which is most intimately related to the self though different from it.

59. *Iśvara* then is the self as shining on and in *māyā* which has the three *guṇas* (attributes or elements) of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, and is accordingly both *triguṇātīta* (transcending these *guṇas*), and *buddha-sattva-upādhi* (invested with a transparent body of *sattva*). Of Him as *triguṇātīta*, *parā-prakṛiti* or the determinate actualised intelligence is the immediate *prakṛiti* or nature; or rather as intelligence itself is an evolute of *aparā*, taking on two aspects (male and female) in the light of Brahman, He as *triguṇātīta* is the unity of *parā* (intelligence as facing the self) and *aparā* (the same intelligence in its objective or passive aspect, the *sattva*-aspect of *aparā* facing its *tamas*-aspect) and yet prior to it. This unity next gets identified with and thus contracted into the *parā* or the transparent garment of *sattva* which thus has before it the *aparā*, with *tamas* as the predominant, though not the sole element. Hence comes the peculiarity that the *parā-prakṛiti* is both different from Brahman and an aspect of Brahman. Hence, too, the possibility of *sattva* being here absolutely pure, though everywhere else the three *guṇas* imply one another. It is the lighted surface of *māyā*, as reflected from which Brahman is *Iśvara*; to this lighted surface, all the interior is darkness, negation. On the outer confines of *māyā*, the 'sacred influence of light' appears, and as 'chaos retires,' 'dim night' too retires, rendered dimmer by contrast. The alchemy of light turns that which it shines on into light. What was dark, negative, utterly false, becomes light, existent, *parā-prakṛiti* which again shoots inward, stratifying *aparā-prakṛiti* which is the equipoise of the *guṇas* into its *sattva* and *tamas* aspects, and getting at every stage identified with the *sattva*-aspect, while the *tamas*-aspect is for ever retiring.

"But now at last the sacred influence
Of light appears, and from the walls of Heaven
Shoots far into the bosom of dim Night
A glimmering dawn. Here Nature first begins
Her farthest verge and Chaos to retire."

60. From the standpoint of Brahman, all this transfigured *māyā* is false. From the standpoint of *Iśvara*, as invested with the transparent body of *sattva*, *sattva* alone is real, *tamas* is unreal—they are not co-ordinate. The 'glimmering dawn'

shot inwards is only the promise of the conquest of the entire realm of chaos, promise of the ultimate perishableness of *tamas*.

61. Brahman and *Isvara* have sometimes been called the higher god and the lower god. The distinction is, to say the least, misleading, and probably the over-definite language of some of the systematising scholiasts is responsible for it. No doubt there is a distinction between the conceptions. Yet *Isvara* is not in reality different from Brahman. As has been already indicated, *Isvara* is the absolute of *savikalpa samādhi*, whereas Brahman is of *nirvikalpa-samādhi*, these states being continuous yet different. As a conception, however, *Isvara* as *triguṇātīta* is different from Brahman.

62. An image will make it clear—a light-sphere in circumambient darkness. From the centre of it, the fulness of light radiates all around, without a thought of the darkness: it is the indeterminate infinite Brahman. At the circumference, however, it reaches its limit (not a resistance) and retires into itself, the limiting darkness falling outside of it; the sphere, as viewed from the circumference inwards, is the determinate Infinite or the closed-in Absolute, *Isvara*. The limit, however, determines its quality, not as darkness but as darkness lighted up, which again defines the darkness (thus the darkness gets stratified). Let us view all this from the standpoint of the individual. In the dim light of reason, in that 'glimmering dawn' in the bosom of night, the individual is lulled by the bright dreams of the morn, not unaccompanied by frightful nightmares; this is the soul-clearing work of morality (*sattva-suddhi*), with its lapses and its despairs, with its toilsome march and its intervals of serenity. At length he wakes up to the glory of a sunrise, is lifted up to absolute consciousness when all the dreams which constituted life and the world he feels to be illusory, for he has now reached his *true* self which he always was but knew not. Still the dreams are there remembered, though now known to be dreams. He exclaims, 'Lo! the Sun (*Isvara*) is there; He has revealed Himself unto me in grace and I am absolute in the Absolute. All that past individuality of mine was but a dream.' Forthwith the duality vanishes in the rapt feeling, 'I am the Sun,' which still means 'I am nothing and the Sun is all. I am no longer the limit outside the object; the limit is but the determination of the object, the object which is conscious of the limit.' Both these stages are the aspects of *Isvara*, the former being the *suddha-sattva-upādhi* aspect, the latter the *triguṇātīta* aspect. 'In the former, He reveals Himself in me, in my absolute consciousness, puts on my absolute consciousness as a garment; in the latter, I become His very self—He not only shines in me but passes out unimpeded and I am dissolved in Him.' In the

former, the light of that sphere passing outwards impinges on darkness, lighting it up; in the latter, the light retires backwards to the centre. But in either case, the light is determinate; in both, there is an awareness of the darkness; the light at first makes it an object and then unites ecstatically with it. *Isvara* as *triguṇātīta* still remembers His feat of transcending *māyā*; the self is conscious of its difference from *Isvara* being illusory. It is just the *passing* into the indifference of Brahman, not the indifference itself. It is the indifference rendered conceivable; yet such is the nature of the conception that its content spurns the form, proclaims its own inconceivability. This conceived inconceivability is the ultimate formula; as conceived, it is the *triguṇātīta* *Isvara*, the inconceivability that is conceived being *triguṇātīta* Brahman. They constitute one unit, one scintillating star; that noble verse in the *Chhāndogya Uparishad*, *śyāmāt śavalam prapadye śavalāt śyāmam prapadye*, 'May I pass from the dark blank to the figured determinate and from thence to the blank again' points to this mystic scintillation of the One reality. No wonder, therefore, that the highest epithets should be applied to *Isvara*, as for example, in the *Sāṅdilya-vidyā* in the *Chhāndogya*, such as one would expect to be applied to Brahman from the characterisations, lower Brahman and higher Brahman, the misleadingness of which must be now apparent.

63. Yet after all it may be asked, why this limitation of a darkness at all? Why the illusion of an individuality at all? As we have seen already, the question itself is illegitimate, for while the individuality is there, it necessarily sees no beginning or end of itself, for all that it knows, it knows under the form of individuality; and when the individuality is transcended, not only is it felt to be an illusion, even its having been illusorily present in the past is felt to be so; so nowhere does it appear as a *contingent reality* of which only we can demand an explanation.

64. But then how should the inconceivable be thought of, referred to at all? It must be because it *reveals* itself in a form which it at the same time condemns. But are not those to whom it reveals illusory also? Why then this illusory revelation in an illusory form to illusory subjects? Once again, this 'why' is an illegitimate demand, an *atiprasṅga*, as it has sometimes been called. As the individual is just passing into *Brahman*, it feels all this to be illusory and then the illusion vanishes. The highest consciousness then for the individual as individual is this consciousness of the illusoriness of his own individuality. This has to be simply accepted; there is no 'why' for this or for Brahman.

65. Before the moment of passing into Brahman, the individual is raised to absolute consciousness (*parā-prakṛiti*), as invested with which *Iśvara* is *śuddha-sattva-upādhi*), when *Iśvara* is known to be knowing the world as His reflex, *i.e.*, as created by His will. Not that the world is created out of nothing; for *Iśvara* assuming *śuddha-sattva-upādhi*, *i.e.*, knowing attitude, means at once having *aparā-prakṛiti* before Him as object and material for His will to mould. But certain old difficulties at once start up. How does this will meet the matter? How does it actualise particular groupings of 'names and forms,' potentially contained in this matter, and this in time, according to law? Why does He will at all, seeing that He, as perfectly actualised, cannot have anything to attain or avoid? The will meets the matter as identical with it, just as the energising body can act on the object, the body being, as we saw but sentient space continuing itself in its movement through space. As to the other questions, a preliminary discussion is required to introduce the Vedantic solutions.

66. The absolute consciousness in which *Iśvara* is revealed is reached only when there is a perfect chastening of the spirit, when it is made the still mirror of truth, not simply by a discipline of the intellect but by an ethical discipline of the will, when all the desires of the individual self have been completely eliminated and the spirit is broadened out so as to comprehend the truest interests of all beings. Ignorance is but the intellectual reflex of evil willing, the shadow of which again deepens the evil, and thus it goes on *ad infinitum*. We have already introduced the notion of every man being born with the seed of all his spiritual life, intellective and conative. Each such seed of *vidyā-karma* (knowledge and action) has a measure of ignorance or evil in it, and the self as embodied in this seed sees no beginning of itself, for it can explain its evil or sin only as due to an ignorance which is not a temporary cloud but is ingrained in the character which constitutes its body, and further it can explain this ignorance only as due to self-imposition, *i.e.*, free sinning, for the self cannot have anything imposed upon it from without. The absolute consciousness is reached only when this substantial ignorance has been dispelled by good willing. So when Fichte said that every man could, if he would, *i.e.*, if he had not a sinning will, rise to intellectual perception and when Schelling thought the very reverse, that 'the capacity for it, like the poetic talent, is possessed by a select few,' that the true philosopher, like the true poet, is born, not made, they held views which are reconciled in the Vedantic doctrine which has already been presented. The ignorance that is ingrained in the seed of *vidyā-karma* with which a man is born shuts out certain forms or planes

of thought *ab initio* from his mental horizon, which no effort of mere thinking can make accessible, just as an instinctive tendency or an ingrained habit cannot be annulled by a single fiat of the will. At the same time there are rational elements or good tendencies in that seed or 'noumenal character' which the will primarily, and the intellect secondarily (with the help of the will), can help to develop, gradually working out the ignorance and the evil. Accordingly when Hegel holds, as against both Fichte and Schelling, that the 'wonderful power of the understanding' alone can be trusted to lead us to every level of thought by a necessary dialectic development, that therefore a bad man can rise step by step up the thought-ladder alone to the highest conceptions of philosophy, Vedanta will press against him the old objection that thought is not knowledge, that even the large range of thought to which the bad man has access is due to the fact that he is not all bad, and that though the thought is continuous with absolute knowledge or intellectual perception, yet at every step this thought, necessary as it is, has the alternative of absolute scepticism beyond it. The smoky flickering flame of mere thought clears up only when the moisture of evil and ignorance in the 'noumenal character' (Schopenhauer) is completely burnt off in the fire of morality.

67. This Vedantic view may now be made the individualistic platform from which we may view the question already suggested, 'Why does *Iśvara* will at all.' *Iśvara* is the crown of the moral consciousness, the unity of all the 'noumenal characters' or the unities of *vidyā-karma* (including not only human spirits but spirits above and below, as is apparent from the Vedantic doctrines of the continuity of spiritual gradations and of metempsychosis). He is again the organism, not only of the spirits—for ignorance, the mother of *Karma*, cannot have place in Him—but of nature, too, furnishing the experiences appropriate to their *Karma* (the *malum poena* to their *malum culpa*). He is the joint organism of moral law and natural law, the latter being only the obverse of the former, the two being the differentiations, mainly *sāttvika* and *tāmasika*, of *aparā-prakṛiti* as interpenetrated by *parā-prakṛiti*. [Were it not for the ignorance begetting *Karma* and begotten of *Karma*, every one would see the unity of moral law and natural law, see that he is the architect of his own fortune, though now virtue and happiness seem to be synthetically connected' (Kant) with each other.] *Iśvara*, however, is not the immanent unity but the transcendent, the latter being his true nature. There are grades of transcendence, too. As primarily transcendent or *triṣuṇāṭīta*. He is in dreamless sleep, with the homogeneous unity of *parā* and *aparā-prakṛiti* as the objective blank before Him the

primal glory in which He rests (*sve mahimni tishthati*). This unity is the *avyākṛita ākāśa*, the unmanifested archetype of space and matter, the absolute *buddhi* (though sometimes taken as only objective, as the first objectivity of *buddhi*), the Vedantic substitute for the *pradhāna* of Sankhya. It is the home of all 'names and forms,' 'unevolved but about to be evolved' (*avyākṛita-vyāchikīrṣhita*), because of its being in immediate unity with the individual wills or noumenal characters, which last in the reflection of *Iśvara* are the *jīvas* or individual souls, called *prājñas* in this connexion, who rest, unconscious of their individualities in this dreamless sleep of the Universal Spirit (*paramēśvaraśrayā māyāmaya mahāsushuptih yasyām svarūpa-pratibodha-rahitāḥ śerate-samsāriṇo jīvāḥ*.—*Sankara's* commentary to *Brahma-sūtras*.) Next *Iśvara* becomes invested with *parā-prakṛiti*, and as such transcends the processes of this unity of *parā* and *aparā*. The individual will-selves have here as much a dual nature as *Iśvara* himself. In dreamless sleep, their mind dissolves into *māyā* and they attain their eternally free (*mukta*) state, their identity with the *triṣṇūṭā*; the same souls, in relation to their life-processes and re-incarnations, are viewed as invested with the first individualising sheath, the 'noumenal character' (the *Kāraṇa-śarīra* or the will-self). But a difference emerges here; for whereas the envelope of *Iśvara* in this aspect is *buddha-sattva* or transparent, that of the *jīva* is *malina-sattva* or impure, partly opaque, dimming the light that shines through it. The impurity is the limitation that constitutes the individuality. But just as the *aparā-prakṛiti* has *buddhi* as its evolute, so too these *malina-sattva* individual souls gradually move towards the *buddha-sattva* type, the *jīvan-mukta* souls (i.e., those who have burst their bonds of individuality and ignorance in this life) being just a stage removed from the *buddha-sattva Iśvara*.

68. A further understanding, somewhat after Schopenhauer of the progressive realisation of these individual spirits is necessary for a clearer explication of the nature of *Iśvara*. The individual wills, asserts himself against the world, nature and society; and as his will spends itself, the world recoils on him. As his willing necessarily means a limitation of vision, the recoil seems to be foreign to him; hence all the misery and apparent injustice of the world. He sets it down to blind nature (or un-just selfish society). This rough tussle with nature and society however, develops in some spirits a generalised and moralised reason, whereas in others it deepens unreason, leading then through impotent strife gradually, through a diminution of life to the level of stocks and stones. Those in whom reason is developed come to perceive that the recoil is their own work

that a punishment as well as a reward is something that is their due, something to which they have a claim. But the Universe is not quite so simple, and it puzzles the reason to lead it peradventure to serener heights or to hurl it down again. For are not the rewards and punishments, notoriously the latter, very often disproportionate to one's *Karma* in this life? What is stranger still, why should evil *Karma* be acquired at all? Why should reason every now and then lapse into irrationality which is the essence of sin? Why again should there be the sudden conversions, the lightning flashes of good inclinations, now and again bursting forth from the leaden cloud of habits? It is only the 'noumenal character' that can explain all this, the character which may not get completely manifested in any one stage of the phenomenal life, not even in one's whole life. The self as identified with it moves freely in the (knowing and), willing process; at every stage, the self recognises the character then manifested to have been pre-existent, unconsciously constituting his individuality. This noumenal seed is not explained by heredity and accidental variations which explain only the outward, naturalistic side of it. The individual self sees no beginning of itself and looks out beyond its life-processes to an uninterrupted existence before birth. The existence of a life before this is intelligible in the light of the relation between the (naturalistic) evolutionary view and the *a priori* view on the one hand and the Vedantic view on the other. The concrete self or the noumenal character is known *a priori*, at any rate recognised in empirical consciousness to have been beginninglessly operative. The empirical account of the origin of this concrete self does not prejudice the validity of the notion of its eternal pre-existence. If its pre-existence is admitted, is it (1) timelessly transcendent, or (2) timelessly immanent in experience or rather in the most concrete experience-system, the whole species regarded as one? Vedanta will hold that it is both. A doctrine somewhat like traducianism is traceable in a passage in *Bṛihad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (I, V, 17—8) on the relation between father and son; other passages may also be referred to. At the same time, just as every object and every combination of objects were found to presuppose eternal 'names and forms,' so every individual soul has its individuating principle in a distinctive *Kāraṇa śarīra*. This *śarīra* is timeless by itself, though its concrete nature, *viz.*, its being the matrix of specific instincts and unconscious cognition-traces points to the experiences of this distinctive body before the present life. Every such will-self, itself only a *name* apart from Brahman—the name being what alone is said to persist after death, after the body has relapsed into the ele-

ments, gross and subtle—is a centre of many names and forms, the shadows of the objects of its experience in all time, with which, however, it is at this height in immediate unity. Such a will-self then, ranging as it does over many lives of the same individual, furnishes us with a solution that considerably lightens the heavy unintelligibility of the *Karma*-system.

69. From the stage, therefore, in which the individual feels himself freely claiming his rewards and punishments, he passes again to the stage in which the recoil is felt to be foreign to him till that mist, too, clears up in the recognition in a far wider sense than before of himself being the *eternal* architect of his own fortune. Here, however, the difficulty comes back in an accentuated form. He does not indeed ask himself, 'why was I cursed with such a noumenal character?'—that would be the voice of the 'devil that is an ass'—for to ask this, one should first be dissociated from the noumenal character which, however, in this dissociation would be illusory. But in the light of the moralised reason that has been developed in him, he will cry out in Augustinian despair, 'Am I then never to escape from this self-imposed self, this radical evil in me? Is final liberation or *Moksha* impossible for me?' In this stage of deep *vairāgya* (denial of the will, repentance), he learns, emotionally and intellectually, of a higher soul (a *guru*) from the revealed Scriptures, or sometimes by spontaneous intuition (sources which are identical in the last resort), that *Ishvara* is the Truth and that his individuality is a lie, that it is only through His light, in His grace (*Karunā*), that he has been hungering and thirsting for *moksha* (liberation) so long, that he, the unregenerate self, has not learnt the blissful truth by an effort establishing claim to it but that his knowing is but God knowing in him.

70. We are now prepared to understand why *Ishvara* is said to will, i.e., to actualise, in grace, the *Karma* of individual souls in order that they may reach *moksha* or identity with Himself. By Himself, He is *triṣuṇātīta*; but as the individual necessarily takes himself to have been beginninglessly existent, *Ishvara* is to him the *good person*, willing this evolving world into existence out of compassion for him, in order that he, by himself, may work out the evil in him. In this stage of duality, he at first takes his experiences of pleasure and pain as the reward and punishment meted out to him by a *Just God*; but as he comes to recognise that they are the necessary reflections of his own nature, he realises that justice is but mercy as viewed through the ignorance which separates him from God, the good principle that has led to this realisation being felt to be the inshining of God Himself. This mercy, then, does not conflict with justice; neither

vaishamya (injustice) nor *nairghrīṇya* (heartlessness) can be predicated of *Isvara*. In mercy, He becomes the good principle in individual spirits, He actualises them, He neutralises the evil in them by inflicting on them punishments (or as Christians put it, by inflicting on Himself their punishments). Yet his mercy is not indiscriminate; it descends on them according to the measure of their *Karma*. In reality, however, *He* does not work at all, *He* does not suffer at all, except in their persons: *Karma* and pain are to Him alike illusory. His willing to actualise them is but the evolution of their *sattva*, through the dynamic of their *Karma*. He is but the breath of the *Karma* system, the organism of justice which is at the same time the organism of grace. His *śakti* or power is but the *Karma* of individual spirits pressing outwards towards fruition. His *ichchhā* or will to create is no bondage to Him. To Him, it is a glorious divine disport or *līlā*; to us, individual spirits, the influx of grace or *Karuṇā*.

71. *Isvara*, as Justice, has His dread aspect, too. Through Him, those in whom *sattva* is dominant rise higher and higher, but those in whom *tamas* is dominant sink deeper and deeper. *Facilis descensus Averni*. Yet if He is universal reality, why is He specially identified with goodness, with all that is 'glorious and beautiful and potent'? It is the old problem of evil—is evil positive in Vedānta? As in Schelling, it is ultimately but the 'dark ground' of goodness. As indicated already, *sattva* is but *tamas* actualised. To most men, however, in whom *sattva* is but imperfectly developed, the evil is co-ordinate with the good, and therefore positive. But as the evil deepens, spiritual vision also gets dimmed; and the misery that follows drags the sinner lower and lower, instead of chastening his soul—there is an increasing helplessness—till the struggle between *sattva* and *tamas* ceases, *sattva* getting completely involved in one dull cloud of unconsciousness (*sthāvaratva*). But, apparently, this does not serve the ends of Divine Justice, far less of Divine mercy. For to whom is the unconsciousness a punishment at all? It may be replied that to the individual left with the last spark of freedom, the passage to this *sthāvaratva* will appear like a sinking into 'eternal perdition.' But how is Divine mercy vindicated? The last fury of the Divine wrath is followed by unconsciousness. The last embrace of Divine love means, too, a lapse of differentiated consciousness. Extremes tend to meet.

72. Let us now consider the state of the *jīvanmukta* which is just the antipodes of the state of *sthāvaratva*. The *jīvanmukta* is one who after repeated births, repeated terms of probation passed successfully, at last kills off all ignorance, all *Karma*, all evil, and reaches absolute knowledge. How does he still remain *jīvat*, living, embodied, the body being only a material-

isation of *Karma* ('objectification of the will,' Schopenhauer) ? *Karma* is divided by Indian philosophers into three sections, *sañchita*, *ārabdha*, and *kriyamāna*. Not all the *Karma* acquired in previous lives receives fruition in this life. The noumenal character does not become fully phenomenalised in *one* life. The part that is manifested, that has started on its course of fruition in this life, is called *ārabdha* (that which has begun), the part that is unmanifested is called *sañchita* (hoarded) and the new *Karma* which is being generated in this life is the *Kriyamāna*. Now the *Jīvanmukta*, having killed off his ignorance, no longer feels the solicitations of desire, and hence acquires no new *Karma*. The *sañchita Karma* is burnt off in the fire of knowledge, destroyed in its embryonic stage. The *ārabdha*, being a unity, must run out its course and cannot be stopped half-way. As in the case of an arrow shot through the air or of the revolving wheel of the potter, the momentum must spend itself out. But then it may be asked while the momentum is there in life, how can there be absolute knowledge or *moksha* ? If, too, *sañchita* be destroyed by this knowledge which shows forth all *Karma* to be illusory, how can the momentum of *ārabdha* be there still ? It is replied that to the *jīvan-mukta* himself, the momentum of his bodily life is nothing in reality : it is positively existent only to others with dim vision. The world, including the bodies of individuals, is but the community of the self-energising *Karma*-unities (energising in the grace of God, which is the deepest sense of self-energising). Natural law is but the obverse face of the moral law. If the body of the *jīvan-mukta* were annihilated for others also, there would be violation of this law, which is absurd. To the *jīvan-mukta* himself, however, the emergence of this knowledge of the illusoriness of his body must appear to be abrupt. He seems to be raised to divine grace without any merit of his own. But to *Isvara*, justice does not admit of being balked. *Karma* can be killed out only by *Karma*, the will can be denied only by the will (Schopenhauer). Yet the will, which has thus completely denied itself would stand out in spiritual pride, were it not for the fact that it gets at this stage (and even earlier) transfigured by reverence (the obverse of grace). In this reverence, in this assurance of free forgiveness, these individual souls elect to continue the divine system of justice and grace by remaining in the body, by freely continuing in the illusory form in relation to other souls. So the *jīvan-mukta* souls assist as the high priests at the cosmic *yajña* or sacrifice, the incense from which is for ever and for ever mounting to the Highest in heaven. They move about like the impersonations of the Divine grace that is dimly stirring in the bosom of the age, the beacon-lights of the universe, the realised hopes of the army of the good,

never self-assertive, sometimes even despondent, fighting out the great battle with the army of the evil. The good triumphs; evil is vanquished and reduced to *sthāvaratva* (unconsciousness). Peace reigns once again; *Ishvara* passes into a deep sleep. This is *pralaya*, Universal Death to the last of the army of the evil just swooning into *sthāvaratva*, the ecstasy of life to the resplendent heroes of the army of the good. When, at any stage of the world, all the *jīvas* come to be ranged under two classes, *jīvan-mukta* and *sthāvara*, there comes on this *pralaya* or dissolution; i.e., the system of *Karma*-forces that started on the course of fruition, the cosmic *ārabdha*, as it might be called, becomes completely dissipated; the *mukta* or liberated need not work, the *sthāvara* cannot work. The cycle closes; there comes the turn for the cosmic *sañchita* (it may be, only a part of it) to mature itself; this includes not only the *sañchita* of those who have been reduced to *sthāvaratva* in this cycle, but also of those so reduced in other cycles. *Ishvara*, the soul of the *Karma*-organism, awakes; there is begun *srishti* or creation over again.

73. And how does he create? He matures this *sañchita*. He proceeds according to law, according to the Vedas. The uniformity of the course of *Karma*-fruition is but the reflection of the Impersonal Reason, which is an emanation of Brahman co-eternal with the creative *Ishvara*. *Ishvara*, having recognised it, has breathed it out in the form of Revelation (*vāk* or *veda*). The *mukta* (free) souls, who have had their *sañchita* all burnt off by knowledge (or, it may be conceived, only those of them whose *sañchita* was acquired in reciprocity with the cosmic *sañchita*, going to be actualised in this creation), now freely, joyously get incarnated as deputy-creators of *Ishvara*, as the strands of His creative *buddhi* or grace, as His *mānasa-putras* (sons begotten of *buddhi*), as the Vedic seers (*Rishis* who see the *mantras* constituting Impersonal Reason), to quicken the *sthāvaras* once again into life, who now look out with young eyes of wonder on the renovated world.

74. Thus *srishti* (creation) succeeds *pralaya* (dissolution) and *pralaya* succeeds *srishti*. *Srishti*, as through *Buddhi* (the will and the intellect being the same to Him), is the function of *Ishvara* in *sattva*-envelope, i.e., of *Brahmā*. *Pralaya*, its obverse is the function of *Ishvara* in *tamas*-envelope (envelope of unconsciousness), i.e., of *Maheśvara*; while *sthiti* (or subsistence of the world) with its upward and downward trends is of *Ishvara* in the envelope of *rajas* as Providence or *Vishnu*. The alternation of the Trinity is eternal; it is only the nothingness of *Karma* artistically exhibited on the stage of time, the empirical picture of *Ishvara* being *triguṇātīta*, an emanation from His being. It may

also be viewed as *evolution* from the point of view of individual souls who, in their moralised reason as evolved with the procession of the cycles, recognise an increasing moral purpose in the procession, assured of their progress towards *moksha* along this "eddying yet advancing stream" of *Karma*.

75. The nature of *Brahman* and *Ishvara* has been explicated at some length. It will suffice now only to indicate the main stages in the onward course of creation, along the three lines (1) *Ishvara* (as invested with *parā-prakriti*), (2) individual souls as embedded in this *parā* and constituting the forces or the weapons of *Ishvara's* activity, and (3) *aparā-prakriti* as gradually differentiated in response to this activity.

76. (1) and (2). In *nirvikalpa samādhi*, the individual is no longer an individual, he is undifferentenced *Brahman*. In *sushupti*, he is like *Ishvara*, dual; *Ishvara* in one aspect is *triguṇātīta* and in another aspect invested with *buddha-sattva-upādhi* or transparent envelope of *sattva* (Section 70), and so the individual is merged in *Brahman* on the one hand (cf. *svam apiti*, attains his self) and is invested with an envelope of undifferentenced *buddhi* on the other. On waking from deep sleep, the individual recognises that he has slept blissfully. This constitutes evidence for the envelope of *buddhi* and explains why it is called *ānanda-maya-kosha* or envelope of bliss. This *ānandamaya* is called the *puchchha* or tail of *Brahman* who is *ānanda* or bliss itself without an envelope. As having limitation in the individual, it is said to be *malina-sattva* or partly opaque, as opposed to the *buddha-sattva* or transparent envelope of *Ishvara*. This opacity or limitation is due to the *samskāras* or the timeless traces of the *vidyā-karma* (knowledge and action) of a past life which constitute the dormant individuality in *sushupti*, making up what is called the *Kāraṇa-śarīra* (will-self) which is viewed as merged in *ānandamaya*. These traces again in their kinetic aspect, i.e., viewed as operative functions, constitute the *viññānamaya kosha*, the envelope constituted by the original springs of thought and volition, the tendencies which may be indifferently regarded as inherited habits or as 'reminiscences of a life before this.' Thus these *samskāras* or *viññānas*, too, are double-faced like Janus, and lie as it were in the borderland between *sushupti* and dream. *Manomaya* is the name applied to the body constituted by *manas*, the receiver or unity of presentations, images and desires (as distinct from the instinctive springs which belong to *viññānamaya*). *Prāṇamaya* is the unity of the five sense-organs (not the bodily sites but the supersensuous principles of seeing, hearing, etc.), the five organs of action (not the limbs supplied with muscles, but rather the radical 'kinæsthetic' presentations—articulation, locomotion, prehension, etc.), and lastly the five *prāṇas* (not

'airs' as they are often translated, but rather the five strands or currents of vital functions in the body). (Without attempting a detailed explanation of *prāṇa*, *apāṇa*, etc., we may point out that these are explicitly distinguished from air, e.g., in the *Brahma-sūtra* 'na vāyu-kriye prithag-upadeśāt,' where *Sankara* describes these as the *adhyātma* counterparts of air. In fact it would appear from other contexts that air is taken to be life instead of life being taken to be air). *Linga-śarīra* or the subtle body is the name given to the complex of the three envelopes, *viññānamaya*, *manomaya*, and *prāṇamaya*, which thus comprises seventeen elements (*buddhi*, *manas*, five sense-organs, five organs of action, and five vital functions). Another name is *sūkṣma-śarīra*, called also *śiśu* and *madhyama-prāṇa* in the *Upanishads*, where it is not often distinguished from the *Kāraṇa-śarīra*. The next body or envelope is the *annamaya* or *sthūla-śarīra*, the material body which the soul enters in waking life but abandons in dream, etc., and after death.

77. The individual soul, as identified with the material body is the *jīva* or *dehin*; the unity of all these *jīvas*, the collective or cosmic self in the waking state is *Virāj* or *Vaisvānara*. As identified with the subtle body, the individual is the *lingin* or *taijasa*, and the unity of all *taijasas* is *Hiranya-garbha* or *Sūtrātman*. Lastly, as identified with the *Kāraṇa-śarīra*, the individual is *prājña*, and the unity of all *prājñas* is *Isvara*. From *Isvara* to *Virāj*, from *prājña* to *dehin*, is the order of *srishti* or progressive materialisation, the reverse being that of *pralaya* or progressive idealisation or de-individualisation. As the progress is continuous, each stage is double-faced, and so what is predicated of *Isvara* is sometimes predicated of *Hiranyagarbha*, and so on.

78. (3) We have already traced the stages of (a) *māyā* as co-ordinate with Brahman, (b) the unity of *parā* and *aparā-prakṛiti* as co-ordinate with the *triguṇātīta Isvara*, and (c) *aparā* with *tamas* predominant as co-ordinate with *buddha-sattva Isvara*. *Ākāśa* in the strictly *adhibhūta* aspect is the last, for the second, though called *avyākṛita ākāśa* (Section 67), is the indifference of *adhyātma* and *adhibhūta*. This *ākāśa*, then, is the obverse face of *buddhi*, the first evolute of *aparā*, the blank of objectivity, the *prius* of space and matter. Next comes *vāyu*, more determinate in character than *ākāśa*, the primordial force or motion filling this *ākāśa* and poising the heavenly bodies each in its proper sphere, force conceived not in its mechanical aspect but as the cosmic life-force that which constitutes the *śakti* or power of the *prājñas*, biuding the *samskāras*, individual and cosmic, to the *buddhi*-units and which, lower down in the course of materialisation, is the nerve-force and the objective

face of undifferentiated sensitivity (touch). The attribute of *ākāśa* is said to be not only emptiness or blank objectivity, but also sound. This sensuous sound, though generated by air-wave, is not air-wave; the sense of hearing (not the bodily apparatus) apprehends the sensuous sound (as distinct from the air-wave); the locus of this sound is *ākāśa*. Sound again is the necessary sensuous basis for even the most abstract thoughts; so *Iśvara* has been said to apprehend the Impersonal Reason co-eternal with Him and to breathe it out in the shape of that potent sound-system, the Vedas. *Vāyu* or air has not only these attributes of *ākāśa*—blankness and sound—but also touch. It is thus more determinate than *ākāśa*, although both are said to be *amūrta* (without form), *amrita* (imperishable), *yāt* (going in every direction, i.e., infinite), and *tya* (invisible or *paroksha*), in contradistinction from the three other primal matters, *tejas*, *ap*, and *prithivī* (fire, water, earth), which are said to be finite and perishable (Bṛihadaranyaka Upanishad, 11, iii). Here, then, is a nodal point in the gradual procession or emanation of the five primal matters, the Vedantic analogues of the Sāṅkhya *tanmātras* (though with a difference), the probable explanation why very often the Upanishads speak of three (the last three) primal matters instead of five. Of the three, *tejas* has *rūpa* or colour in addition to the attributes of *vāyu*; *ap* has *rasa* or taste (which goes with liquidity in all its variations) in addition to those of *tejas*; and *prithivī* has smell in addition to those of *ap*.

79. It may be pointed out that the theory of these five primal matters does not, in any way, conflict with the theory of the *elements* in Chemistry. The principle of classification is altogether different. The five matters are the concretes or objectives corresponding to the five kinds of sensation, the sensations being taken as the attributes of objects (and attributes in Vedānta are identical with substance). Whether such a classification is fruitful of results or not is a different enquiry; at any rate it fits in with the peculiar idealism of Vedānta. One is tempted to connect it with Mill's dictum that the number of primary laws of nature cannot be less numerous than the distinguishable feelings of the human mind; only what is regarded as a mere abstract concept or law by the empiricist is taken in Vedānta to be substantial matter (Section 42).

80. Besides, it is to be noticed that if *ākāśa* is conceived to stand on the level of *sushupti*, and *vāyu* on the borderland between *sushupti* and dream, the three other elements stand on the level of dream, while the elements of Chemistry are all on the level of waking or the level of gross matter. On this waking level, Vedānta would introduce these primal matters, not in their

simplicity but as illusorily compounded or *pañchīkṛita* (quintupled). *Pañchīkaraṇa* is the name given to the process of the combination of the matters according to a formula like $\frac{1}{2}a$, $\frac{1}{3}b$, $\frac{1}{4}c$, $\frac{1}{5}d$, $\frac{1}{6}e$ where a, b, c, d, e , stand for the matters. Sometimes when the last three matters are alone taken, the process is called *tribhīkaraṇa* or tripling ($\frac{1}{2}a$, $\frac{1}{4}b$, $\frac{1}{6}c$). The *ākāśa*, *vāyu*, etc., which are perceived by our senses, are only the modes of this compounded matter, the primal matters being supersensuous.

81. The shadowy 'names and forms' imbedded in the primal *māyā* get actualised as material objects in this *pañchīkṛita* matter. The noumenal will-self here gets materialised into a *dehin*; here then is the sphere of *Karma*-fruition and also of moral probation.

82. We may conclude the present study with a paraphrase (with interpretation-) of two cosmogonic accounts from the Upanishads, in illustration of the Vedantic views already discussed. The first is from *Chhāndogya Upanishad* VI, ii.—This (empirical world, differentiated into names and forms) was barely existent in the beginning (was the bare 'that' as distinct from the 'what'), one without a second (homogeneous with it or heterogeneous). It saw (*aikshata*, thought and willed, which mean the same thing to it), 'I shall be many: I shall generate,' and accordingly created *tejas* (fire). Then *tejas* thought, 'I shall be many, I shall generate,' and accordingly created water. Water next thought, 'I shall be many, I shall generate,' and created earth (*annam*).

(This One Existent (*sat*) is then intelligence and not the unintelligent *pradhāna* of Sankhya.) This creation according to *Sankara*, is emanation (*vivarta*), for nothing can be distinct from *Sat*. Fire, water, etc., also thought, i.e., as embodied in these, *Sat* thought and instituted the successive steps of creation. Each link in the chain of causation is not only a medium but a true cause in the reflection of the First Cause. This amounts to saying that God creates reasonably, according to Law).

VI, iii.—All living beings, whether oviparous, viviparous, or vegetable, generate their respective seeds. (These are the *jīvas* or the beginningless units of individuality).

The One God (*Sat*, willed, "I shall introduce myself into these three gods (fire, water, earth, the basal *devatās*) through this *jīva* (these beginningless *principia individuationis*, i.e., as *Sankara* takes them, the *saṃ-skāras*, in the *buddhi* of the *Sat*, of the forms of a past creation) and make 'names and forms' manifest. I shall render each of these (basal) *devatās* three-fold (*tribhīta*, which does not deny *pañchīkṛita* or quintupled, explained already)." So it did.

83. The next passage is from *Bṛihad-āraṇyaka Upanishad*, I, ii. It exhibits the characteristic mystic imagination of the Upanishads. Here a large latitude of conjectural interpretation must be allowed. *Sankara's* interpretations have been accepted, wherever available.

There was nothing here in the beginning. Everything was shrouded by Death or Hunger. This Hunger is Death. He created *manas*, in order that He might feel Himself (invested) with a mind.

(This Death is here identified by *Sankara* with *Hiranyagarbha*. He is in fact *Hiranyagarbha* as passing into *Ivara*. He is the Universal Hunger which has retracted into itself the entire evolved world. Again, as Hunger is at once the destructive and creative stress of the *prāṇamaya*, so the self of dissolution or death is the self of creation or life. Thus Death wanting to be Life, i.e., wanting to create, created to Himself a mind to anticipate the creation. The will-self is imbedded in intelligence. We have already explained the alternation of *pralaya* and *srishti*).

He worshipped and was satisfied. As He worshipped (fire and) water came into being, as the 'embodied parts of his devotion' (*Pūjāṅga-bhūtāḥ*).

(Death has now passed into the living mind, which now re-duplicates itself, becomes self-conscious. Creation here is self-consciousness, self-worship. Worshipping a god is becoming that god. Nature is sometimes spoken of as the 'processio of the Holy Spirit' or as 'a sacramental system.' Of the 'embodied parts of the worship,' fire (with special reference to the sacrificial fire of the *aśvamedha* sacrifice) is the direct embodiment, and water is the indirect embodiment; for fire is said to be situated both within and outside water. The series from *ākāśa* to *prithivī* is one of growing determinateness, and after *vāyu*, of descending magnitude, too).

(Fire thus situated) thickened the froth of the waters and turned it into Earth. As He thus created Earth, He became fatigued and forth exuded from within His fiery perspiration.

(The self-worship of *Hiranya-garbha* means the encasement of Himself in the primal matters evolved out of *tamas* (i.e., out of the imperfections or *Karma* of the individual selfs) and then the irradiation of this envelope with the fire of the self within, which makes the whole a living, developing 'mundane egg.' Self-worship means 'being at once the worshipped and the grosser worshipping self').

Now this fire or life (*prāṇa*) within this mundane egg divided itself into three parts, *āditya* (the sun, being the eye and soul

of *ākāśa*), air and fire, without losing its identity. (Thus all the five matters are mentioned.) This last (fire) rests on water.

He (Death) wanting a second body (other than *manas*) effected a junction between His mind and *vāk* (the Word). The generative seed (entering the waters) developed into the year (*sambatsara*).

[This second body is the *pañchikṛita* body of *Virāj*. *Vāk* is objective or Impersonal Reason, that which is coined into words in the Vedas. He united thought with *vāk*, i.e., reflected on the order of creation as laid down in the Vedas, on the eternal Logos or the Law. The generative seed is the cosmic system of *vidyā-karma* acquired in a previous life of *Hiraṇya-garbha*, the collective self of all individual units of *vidyā-karma*. No creation out of nothing; the matter (fire, etc.) is but *aparā-prakṛiti*, the ignorance constituting individuality, as encasing the self; the forms are the primordial *principia individuationis*, the *Karma*-units; the law is eternal and is only recognised by this mind-endowed (*samānaska*) *Hiraṇya-garbha*. He makes *Karma* fructify, in grace (its obverse being self worship), according to law, by reflecting on it (for His knowing is willing). The Logos, quickened by reflection becomes the generative seed (*parā prakṛiti*) planted in the waters (in the primal matters generally, in *aparā-prakṛiti*) and develops into the year. The year is the eternal Idea of the concrete year; the yearly procession of events as a whole, ever repeating itself in the kaleidoscope of sensuous apprehension, represents a single pulsation (differentiation) of His life. It is the prototype of the infinite of waking time, not yet born].

It took a year for the egg to be hatched. Thus came the year into being: there was no year before this. When the babe *Virāj* was born, Death opened His jaws to devour it, and *Virāj* screamed out in terror. Thus speech came into being.

(The babe is the waking world just beginning to see light. It is the first waking actuality, the potentiality of all the future. The phenomenal world, however, from the moment it comes into being, is in the jaws of death (cf. *Chhāndogya*, *mṛityunā grastameva*); it is an illusory differentiation. *Virāj* screamed as the babe just born would scream, as its blank consciousness emerges from the dark unconsciousness which still hangs over it. Sound is, in more senses than one, the bridge between the visible world and the invisible).

Death paused and thought, 'Why devour the babe? (Let it have its spell of sensuous development.)' So it developed according to *vāk* (Impersonal Reason) into the articulate Vedas, Vedic metres, sacrifices, men, animals, etc.

(Vāk has three forms : (1) Objective Reason, (2) this as actualised in thought or reflection, (3) this as sensuously developed into the Vedas.....The Vedas are again prior in reality to the phenomenal world. The position of sound (*ākāśa*) between phenomenon and noumenon is to be noticed).

All this sensuous creation He seized to devour. Death desired to celebrate a second *Aśvamedha* (horse-sacrifice, the first being that performed in a previous life by virtue of which He came to exist at the beginning of the cycle). He became weary and began to practise austerities (*tapas*). Forth departed from His body (the *Virāj*-body) sentiency and power, leaving it 'turgid and defiled.' But his mind never lost sight of it.

(The *Virāj*-body has to die, to be sacrificed in order to live. He was weary, impressed with the nothingness of the sensuous body as such, which is always in the jaws of death. But this sensuous life has to be lived through. Let it be a life of self-sacrifice then. Let the body be purified. So His heart was all along set on this purification).

He thought, 'Let this body be *medhya* first, i.e., worthy of being sacrificed, and then I shall get embodied in it.' Meanwhile the body had become 'turgid' (*aśvat*), and so as He entered it once again, He became an *aśva* or horse (a sensuous body which the higher self fills, but with which it does not get confused. May we not trace here something like the stages of modern Ethics : (i) naive sensuousness, (ii) a division in spirit and asceticism, the sensuous body to be thoroughly mortified, (iii) reinstatement of the sensuous self as conscious of its nothingness by itself yet justifying its existence as an organ or duty ?)

He let the horse loose for a year (as they do at the *Aśvamedha* ceremony) and then tied it up and offered it as a sacrifice, offered up each animal as a sacrifice to its proper god (offered up Himself as a sacrifice to Himself) and thus attained the state of *Prajāpati*. Thus He conquered the second death (became the archetypal Life, and is not born again to be devoured by death).

(The year here stands for the cycle of *samsāra*, the wheel of *Karma* from which *jīvas* fly at a tangent into *moksha* (liberation), into a Death which has conquered itself, into Eternal Life. 'Letting Loose' represents the fact that God lets the individual eliminate his Karma by Karma, till in knowledge the individuality lapses altogether).

III. Vedantic Logic. (Mainly based on *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*.)

84. The central truth of the Vedantic system, the pure self or Brahman as undifferented 'being, consciousness, and bliss,' together with other ancillary truths about supersensuous things, is taken by Vedanta to be essentially revealed, not ascertained by any human evidence like that of perception or inference. The self that is immediately perceived, for example, is not known to be existent, far less to be existent after death. (*Sankara* says this in his introductory note to *Bṛihadāranyaka Upanishad*, and it is pretty much the same as what Kant says about the 'paralogisms of the Pure Reason.') True, even in Vedanta, arguments are advanced in proof of the existence and immortality of the soul, but these are *only suggestions of the Beyond* by phenomenal signs, not proofs positive, as they have been taken by *Naiyāyikas*. If the ecstatic intuition in which alone the supersensuous is knowable is not forthcoming at once, and if the phenomenal world only *suggests* the noumenon as a thought, though it may be necessary thought, how is the enquiry into it to begin at all? Some provisional belief (*śraddhā*) is required to start the enquiry. A mere thought, even though necessary, can never induce belief, can never be mistaken for knowledge; for in knowledge there is an unmistakable intuitive or 'given' character. This provisional belief can only be induced by authoritative statement (*śabda* or *āgama*) which may, for aught we know, be disproved afterwards. But the statement gains in reliability if on acting on it or after contemplation of it we attain a progressive *satisfaction or realisation*. That is the only justification which we may expect to have of the truth of what is claimed to be revelation, from below, *i.e.*, before we have finally realised its truth. Whether metaphysical enquiry necessarily presupposes a revelation is an issue which need not be confused with the other issue whether the Veda itself is revealed or not. If it be granted that spirit can only teach spirit and that truth can only be *recognised* and not created by mental activity, it must also be granted that revelation is necessary, and that the Word is God, and that accordingly there should be an eternal succession of omniscient teachers.

85. At the same time Vedanta allows that for the attainment of the knowledge of *Brahman*, there is required not only *śravaṇa* (hearing of revealed texts and trying to understand them) but also *manana* and *nididhyāsana*. The exact relation of these

processes has been disputed, but the processes themselves are recognised in all Vedantic schools. *Manana* is defined as 'the mental act which generates knowledge by means of arguments defending the truths embodied in the texts against objections preferred by other evidences' (*pramāṇa*). Inference, and the other natural sources of knowledge, cannot yield the sacred truths but only point to them. So the proofs of the existence of God in European philosophy have sometimes been pronounced to be no proofs, for the conclusion there necessarily transcends the premises. Inference, etc., however, show the direction along which one may proceed to the truths. They refute heretical objections; and by detaining the thoughts about the truths, they enable the mind to get a tight grip of them and thus prepare the way for realising them in ecstatic intuition.

86. Hence the position of logic in Vedanta. It considers all the *pramāṇas* or sources of knowledge. They are six in number: *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *āgama*, *arthāpatti*, *anupalabdhi*. It is advisable to keep up the Sanskrit names, instead of giving the ordinary translations, some of which are, to say the least, misleading. Other schools of Indian Philosophy give shorter lists, but Vedanta vindicates the necessity of each of these *pramāṇas*. It will be noticed that logic here is conceived to have a more extended scope than is ordinarily allowed to it, including as it does a consideration not only of mediate but also of immediate knowledge. It necessarily comprises a good deal of epistemological matter.

87. Knowledge is of two kinds: *anubhava*, reached through evidence (*pramāṇa*), which may be both true (when it is *pramā*) and false, but which is always something new, previously unattained; and *smṛiti* or memory-knowledge which, however, is not something new. In the persisting cognition of the same object, there is a single unchanging presentation illuminated by, i.e., subsumed under the form of the self. Such a persisting determinate cognition (as distinct from the presentation) ceases, however, when it is contradicted by another cognition standing on stronger evidence. The theory of the persistence of the presentation fits in with the peculiar realism of Vedanta which demands an intuition-continuum for every grade of abstract thought (Section 34). The necessary thought of the identity between a presentation and an idea must have its basis in the continuity of the presentation in some real medium. Besides, as knowledge is viewed in Vedanta from the standpoint of the self as spontaneity and not from the empirical standpoint, the logical activity of the self (and not the presentation) is taken to determine *how long* a mode of cognition can be said to endure as one and the same; it is said to cease only when contradicted.

Pratyaksha (External and Internal Perception).

88. Perception, as has already been explained (Section 23) is Brahman itself, the immediate identity of knower and known. In fact the attitude of *nirvikalpa-samādhi* is retained in the perception of phenomenal objects. There is a difference no doubt between the timeless knowledge of Brahman and the abrupt emergence of the perceptual knowledge; but even in the latter the knowledge by itself is timeless and quiescent, its manifestation only being in time. The image of dust-motes getting into a quiescent sunbeam will furnish an apt illustration. Presentations are in time; they manifest the self and limit it at the same time. All determinate knowledge is a self-abnegation, involving as it does a stratification of the pure consciousness or *chaitanya* into three forms: *pramātri-chaitanya* or determinate self-consciousness, *vritti-chaitanya* or modes of consciousness, and *vishaya-chaitanya* or empirical object.

89. In perception the *manas* (streaming out of the sense-orifices of the body in visual and auditory perception and keeping at its bodily seat in the other forms of sense-perception) is said to take the form of the object, *i.e.*, get determined into a mode or *vritti* like the object, occupying the same position in space and time as the object, both being pervaded by an identical (determinate) consciousness or *chaitanya*, provided, of course, the object is capable (*yogya*) of being cognised by the senses. An explanation is necessary.

90. That an influence from the object produces sensation in us need not be denied by Vedānta. The point here is the explanation of that extra-organic localisation which specially marks visual and auditory perception. Now in perception, there is a tendency to slur over the sensation-sign and pass at once to its significate, constituted by motor and other ideas. What is this *signifying*? Rapid association, mental chemistry may be granted, but what is it from the point of view of the self? From the standpoint then of the self, as invested with *manas*, as knowing the not-self *in space* viewed through the glasses of the *manas*, may it not be held that the Vedāntic account of the mind going out to meet the object is truer than the confused physiological account that the object or influence from the object comes to meet the mind as located in the body? Even in the grossest form of consciousness, when the body is taken to be the point of reference, not being distinguished from the self, Vedānta recognises in this going out the priority of the knower to the object and so still keeps the meaning of knowledge intact. If it be argued that growing reflection will shift the point of reference from the body to something more spiritual, it is replied that unless one rises to levels of consciousness higher than

the waking, the self cannot be thought of except as located in the body. The objection that the streaming out of *manas* involves a materialistic conception is easily disposed of if we remember that Vedānta recognises no absolute distinction (Section 42) between the self and material object but admits grades of emanatory existences between them, each being material in relation to the grade before it, what we mean by matter coming last in the series. Ultimately no doubt Vedānta will hold that the body is phenomenal, this space also is phenomenal, and that this 'going out' of the mind is only illusory.

91. 'The mind takes the form of the object.' It is the idea of the conformity of the mental order with a *given* order. No idealisation can completely do without this *given* element. Below ecstatic intuition where this 'given'-ness completely disappears, dualism is inevitable.

92. The mind and the object occupy the same space-position. This distinguishes perception from inference. In inference, the mind only *thinks* of the inferred object but does not go out to meet it. The distinction is practically that drawn in modern psychology, only viewed from the point of view of the self's spontaneity, that in perception the given element and its interpretation are welded together in a unity, while in inference they are kept distinct. In perception, the self as invested with the mental mode (the interpretative concept, which, relatively to the sensation, is the beginningless *vāsanā* or *samskāra*, analogous to the eternal names and forms actualised in creation) becomes further materialised into the particular function of the sense-organ excited by the particular stimulus (and this might be regarded as a maturation of its *Karma*). In inference the self just expects to be realised : it descends from its plane to a lower plane, but not to the lowest. (Sometimes the tension is so great that it discharges itself in the waking plane; in other words, inference lapses into a percept, as in 'I see my brother.' Does not this show that all perception is illusory, as it is always *seeming* to see, the mind forgetting itself and becoming the body) ?

93. The perceptive act and the object occupy the same time-position. The object of memory precedes the act of memory. But it may be *ekadeśa* with it, *i.e.*, occupy the same position as it, in the same sense in which, in internal perception, a pleasure is said to be *ekadeśa* with the perception of the pleasure. What then is this *deśa* ? It should be remembered that in Vedānta, *ākāśa* appears in all the stages, waking, dream, etc., and there is the theory of the intermediate existences between self and matter.

94. One *chaitanya* pervades both *vishaya* (empirical object) and *vṛtti* (apprehending mental mode). This is readily under-

stood in the light of Kant's theory of the self working unconsciously in the object-consciousness: all consciousness is *implicitly* self-consciousness. This 'implicitness,' this indistinguishable blending of the subject and object, is precisely what is brought out in this identity of *chaitanya* (self) covering *vishaya* (object) and *vritti* (mental mode).

95. *Yogyatva* or 'the object being capable of being perceived' distinguishes perception from *śabda* (knowledge through authoritative statement) which last can take cognisance of supersensuous objects as spiritual merit and demerit (*dharmādharmā*).

96. In the case of a judgment in which the subject is perceived but the predicate is inferred, or in which the terms are perceived through different senses, if the judgment be *one* substantive mental state, the foregoing account of the perceptual process is not tenable; for how can *manas* at once go out of the body and be in it or go out of two different sense-orifices at the same time? But then, according to Vedānta, the judgment is not *one* state but rather a process from the subject-thought to the predicate thought. It would appear, from its criticism of *Nyāya*, that a judgment, according to it, does not involve a conceptualistic universal, co-substantial with the terms and eternally connected with them (Section 43). Vedānta might hold that this transition from the subject to the predicate is a necessary thought of the union of the terms, but then this does not mean their concrete identity-in-difference. If the thought be concretely realised (in the Vedantic sense, i.e., through the judging self being de-individualised), the relation will cease to be relation; one would see their undifferented identity. When the copula is concretely realised, the terms are lower in reality; when the copula is only abstract, the terms are of higher reality.

97. The perception of object so long discussed may not amount to the knowledge of object *as object*, i.e., as distinct from the subject and yet related to it. Mere perception of object requires only the coincidence of *vritti-chaitanya*, with *vishaya-chaitanya* (Section 88), but the perception of object as object requires also their coincidence with *pramātri-chaitanya*. It requires that the self should not be a mere logical pre-supposition, it should come out as determinate self-consciousness as distinct from object-consciousness. The *vritti* or mental mode in relation to which the object exists—for the object is only empirical object—is a determination of *pramātri* or the determinate self. The *vritti* then points two ways, towards the self and towards the object. At each moment, the whole of *manas* gets modified into *vritti* (this being *vivarta* or emanation, not *pariṇāma* or real modification), by the ripening of some *samskāra* or *Karma-seed*, under the stress of the cosmic *Karma-organism*

appearing as stimulus. So on the one hand the *samskāra* gets materialised into a percept and the percept into a bodily (cerebral) impression; on the other the cosmic stress takes the form of the phenomenal object (and that gives the sense-stimulus). (This account has to be expanded a little to explain the extra-organic localisation in visual and auditory perception). Thus the *pramātri chaitanya* rests on the *vishaya-chaitanya* in the perception of the object as object.

98. In the internal perception of the self, the *pramātri-chaitanya* does not rest on *vishaya-chaitanya*, but rests simply on *vritti*. Not that it is then the *pure self* seeing the *vritti* as object; it sees, only *as invested with vritti*, only as determined, *i.e.*, as it sees in a dream. So *Sankara*, in his commentary on *Brih. Upanishad* IV, iii, points out that in the stage of dream the self-luminous (*svayam-jyotir*) self sees the dream-forms as object and therefore is itself revealed; but in the stage of *sushrupti*, where *vritti* or mental mode lapses altogether, the self-luminosity is *not* revealed, being present in its purity. To be visible, an object must not be perfectly transparent.

99. So it is held on the one hand that *ahamkāra* (Section 57) requires a *vritti* or empirical mode and on the other that even in illusory object-consciousness, there is a real materialisation of the self. The last point requires explanation. When the nacre is mistaken for silver, the nacre, a mode of *māyā* (as every phenomenal object is) modifies the mental mode coincident with it by the idea of silver which it revives by similarity. The self looking through it sees the objective illusory mode, silver. This theory of an objective illusory mode or *anirvachanīya* existence is characteristic of Vedānta.

100. *Objections met* :—(1) If the illusory object, silver, is created in the absence of silver, we could see anything of which we have an idea, *i.e.*, there could be no difference between image and percept. So it is held by the *anyathā-khyāti-vādin* that in such a case, the self freely, perversely applies to the nacre a predicate, silver, which does not belong to it but to something else. No illusory object, silver, is here created. We only *think*, pass *intellectually* to, the object silver, which, however, exists somewhere. The reply is that to take the interpretative element in perception (true or false) to be merely intellectual or merely associational (representative) would be alike wrong—it is really a concept based on an associated image. This concept is the necessary *objective* element, the image is the *subjective* element. Yet though the subjective element is there, Vedānta would argue against the *ātma-khyāti-vādin* that the silver in this case is not *consciously* remembered. Such a subjectivity, unconscious of its subjectivity, is nothing but the *anirvāchya* or 'inexplicable,

prātibhāsika or illusory objectivity. The objectivity, however, which is contrasted with a conscious subjectivity, would be the phenomenal or *vyavahārika* reality. In the presence of the thing-in-itself or *pāramārthika* reality, these two realities are just the same, both illusory; but this thing-in-itself is knowable precisely because in the reflection of its light, *māyā* itself is differentiated into the (phenomenally) real and the illusory.

101. (2) How to know that this nacre is silver? Through the coincidence in position (*ekadeśatva*) of the two objective modes of *māyā*, the corresponding subjective modes, and *pramātrichaitanya*. (3) Why is not the illusory silver apparent to all? An object-determination is a determination of the particular subject who has the illusion. That most things, however, appear much the same to all is explained by a community of the *Karma* of different selfs. (4) If in all judgments, there is a transition from one cognition to another (Section 96), how can there be a false perceptual judgment at all? It is replied that in the perceptual judgment 'this nacre is silver,' there is a coincidence of the determinations of *chaitanya* corresponding to 'this' and 'silver'; as a single cognition therefore it admits of truth and falsehood. (5) Why not say, 'this is sometimes silver, sometimes nacre'? because when the (apparent) percept of silver ceases, one is not conscious of the real silver being absent but only of the illusory silver having vanished (Section 46). When a percept is contradicted by another percept, there is indeed no final guarantee that the contradicting percept is not illusory instead of the contradicted percept—for there can be such a thing as illusion of illusion; still there is the psychological fact that while in the contradicting perception, one has to believe that it is true and that the contradicted perception is false. It is the abrupt disappearance of the silver when looked at carefully with the naive belief (coupled in many cases with a reflective inferential belief) that what is looked at carefully is real, that accounts for our disbelief in the persistence of silver.

Anumāna (Inference).

102. The Vedantic theory of the nature of inference is best studied in relation to the *Nyāya* theory of inference in its two aspects, inference as the process of discovering truth for oneself (*svārtha*), and as the form of proving or exhibiting the truth to others (*parārtha*). The main contention between Vedānta and *Nyāya* is in regard to the former.

103. Three stages in the inferential process are recognised in *Nyāya*. In the example, 'the mountain has fire, because it

has smoke,' there must have been established, first, a constant concomitance (*vyāpti*) between fire and smoke, from their occurring together in kitchens, etc., then this smoke must have been perceived in the mountain (*paksha-dharmatā*), and finally this last relation is combined with the memory of the *vyāpti* (*tritiya-linga-parāmarśa*) in order to get the conclusion, 'the mountain has fire.' In other words, the middle term is first (inductively) related to the major, then to the minor, and then the two relations are related to one another. The three processes may be symbolised thus :—(i) A_m connected with A_p , B_m-B_p , C_m-C_p $m-p$; (ii) X_m has m (is like A_m , B_m which have p); (iii) X_m has m , $m-p$; (reappearing in memory); the two together leading to ' $\therefore X_m$ has p .'

104. To this account Vedānta has the following objections : (a) The first two stages precede the inference and are no part of it; (b) ' $m-p$ ' in the third stage is more a function (*samskāra* or *vyāpāra*) than a substantive mental state, though it is a conscious function, being quickened with the consciousness of the middle term; (c) ' $m-p$,' the function, though retained in memory, is not operative as a conscious remembrance. (A conscious remembrance of it may sometimes accompany the inference though forming no part of it). (d) The whole proposition, ' X_m has p ' is not inferred : p only is inferred, X_m being perceived.

105. The second objection, in a sense, comprehends all the others. It is connected with the Vedāntic position on *jāti* already explicated (Section 43). When Mill holds that the conclusion in a syllogism is drawn, not from the premises but according to them only, that not rules but facts constitute the evidence, he agrees with Vedānta (and Hegel) in disbelieving in the abstract universal being co-substantial with things and eternally connected with them. How can an eternal thing be eternally connected with non-eternal things? The so-called axiom of the syllogism cannot possibly subsume particulars under it, for the simple reason that no premise is absolutely true. From the purely conceptualistic point of view (that of Nyāya), the unity of the inferential act is never really attained; the relation of relations, as in *tritiya-linga-parāmarśa*, is unintelligible. So long as the universal is regarded as a substantive state of the mind and not a spontaneity (a 'transitive' state, as James would call it), the judgment must be regarded as pieced out of terms and reasoning as pieced out of the separate judgments, instead of reasoning being regarded as the unity prior to them all. Not that Vedānta accepts the Hegelian solution of the identity of contradictories. To it, the entire inferential process is summed up in the single word 'function,' which does not constitute a substantive unity with the given minor term and the major

term. Hence, too, the conclusion is taken to be, not the whole proposition ' X_m has p ' but only p . This accords with the Vedantic view of the judgment, already presented under perception (Section 96). This is also intelligible in the light of the general Vedantic position that a grade of reality (to which, for example, the *jāti* as the connotational universal belongs) (Section 42) is unconsciously immanent in the next grade (to which the corresponding *vyaktis* or individuals belong) which it transcends but where, if consciously emergent at all, it is taken as an abstract thought lower in point of reality. *Buddhi*, which is the self-affirmation in the copula, transcends *manas* which is yet informed by it. The axiom of the syllogism, like axioms in general, stands on the level of *buddhi* and is a timeless *samskāra*.

106. It must not be supposed, however, that Vedānta takes this process or function to be merely blind expectation, the working of an *anulbuddha* or unawakened *samskāra*. The awaking of it helps on the function (*tadudbodhasyāpi sahakāritvāt*). It is in fact a conscious function, an intellectual synthesis, and not an imaginative or associational synthesis. The major premise, according to Mill, is only a concurrent or subsequent justification of the conclusion. But is not the justification essential to inference as distinct from association? So Spencer holds in his *Psychology* (Special Analysis, Reasoning), where he says that though the major premise comes after the conclusion, it is recognised to have been operative before the conclusion, the recognition being the completion of the reasoning, without which in fact the reasoning would not be reasoning. In 'the mountain has fire because it has smoke,' the perception of the smoke rouses into conscious activity the *samskāra* of the relation between smoke and fire. This *samskāra*, though conscious, is not present as a conscious memory (*smṛiti*). The logical ground of inference is objective; it is not subjective memory. In illusory perception and in dreams, the *anīrvachanīya* object (Section 99) is a memory-image, unconscious of its memory-character.

107. As to the major premise itself or *vyāpti*, it is not an inference by itself, being only the *samskāra* generated by the observation of the concomitance (*anvaya*) between the major term and the middle term (and non-observation of nonconcomitance), but not by the observation of the concomitance of the absences of the terms (*vyatireka*). As against Nyaya, it is argued that the positive evidence alone generates belief. The negative evidence only assures the reason, constitutes a collateral justification. It is clear that this criticism of Nyaya is directly connected with the Vedantic position that the major premise is only a *function*, a consciously operative universal, and not an abstract reason only. All inference is then *anvayi-*

rūpa, i.e., founded on positive concomitance. It is not, however, to be called *Kevalānvayi*, as arguments like 'this pot is knowable because nameable' are called, where according to Nyaya, *vyatireka-vyāpti*, i.e., concomitance between not-nameable and not-knowable is not ascertainable, because the terms do not stand for anything existent. According to Vedanta, there is no *Kevalānvayi* inference; as Brahman is the constant ground of all differenced reality, the negation of all things is existent. According to nominalistic existential logic, the negative concept 'not-A,' which has no positive existent equivalent, is altogether inadmissible in logic; and therefore a positive concept like A, of which the negation is non-existent, is also inadmissible. According to conceptualistic logic (including Nyaya), there is a place for all that is conceivable, and therefore there is a place for a concept like A, though not-A be non-existent. In realistic Vedanta (realistic like Kantianism), even the self-contradictory, not to speak of a mere conceivable, is positive; and what would sound paradoxical, the self-contradictory is the only positive both in the sense that the phenomenon in which contradiction is immanent is the only thing determinately knowable. Brahman being indeterminate, and in the sense that, apart from Brahman to which all contradictory predicates aspire, the phenomenal system is a house of cards or mere negation.

108. Vedanta further holds that the *number* of the instances observed is inessential to the induction or *vyāpti*. How to reconcile this with the view of empirical logic that it is *the one* essential point in induction? Spencer, in his discussion of the Universal Postulate, holds, as against Mill, that though the belief in an axiom is generated by the instances, they are not separately registered in the mind but rather operate as a consolidated function, the inconceivability of the opposite being its negative justification. So the positively operative universal is not the separate instances but the knowledge of the objective relation between the middle term and the major term. How this knowledge or belief is itself generated, how the number of instances affects its *strength*, is a question for psychology rather than for logic. The so-called syllogism of inclusion or exclusion is no inference at all or is inference only because the number leads us to expect some necessary connotational connexion. Logic is concerned primarily with truth and only secondarily, if at all, with the intensity of the belief and degree of certainty.

109. So much for the process of inference (*svārtha*). To exhibit its cogency to others (*parārtha*), we require an ideal form like the syllogism which, as Mill said, is no inference but only the form of inference. Here, too, a difference emerges between Nyaya

and Vedanta. Where Nyaya states five members of the syllogism. (1. The mountain has fire. 2. Because of the smoke. 3. Whatever has smoke has fire, as the kitchen. 4. This mountain has it. 5. Therefore it has fire), Vedanta states only three, either the first three (analytical) or the last three (synthetical). The third member represents the major premise with the statement of an instance ('the kitchen'), other than the minor term, falling under the middle term, which is necessary to obviate the appearance of a *petitio principii* in the syllogism. The second or the fourth member represents the minor premise and the first or the fifth the conclusion. The two premises, appearing only as functions in *svārtha* inference, have to be exhibited as substantive propositions in *parārtha* inference. The considering of them together to secure the unity of the inference, which is taken by Nyaya to be a distinct step in *svārtha* inference, is exhibited by it in the *parārtha* inference by presenting the minor premise twice, first as the second member which is the bare cognition of the middle term, and then as the fourth member which is this cognition spread out as a proposition, and sandwiching the *vyāpti*-function, here spread out as the major premise between them; the conclusion, too, is put both at the beginning and at the end. All this, apparently, according to Vedanta, is artificial; for in *parārtha* inference, we should trust the hearer to function for himself and content ourselves with sketching the outlines of the language-picture which might start the necessary functioning in his mind.

110. Hegel has taught us to look beyond logical forms, to the absolute realities of which they are shadows. Now the absolute of *pratyaksha* or perception is Brahman (Section 88); it reveals Brahman even in a phenomenal object. To admit empirical reality is at the same time to admit the concept of reality. So inference reveals to us the unreality of the phenomenal universe, the members of the absolute inference being, 'This universe is unreal, because different from Brahman; all that is different from Brahman is unreal, like the silver in the nacre.' It has already been explained that when one is just passing into an intuition of Brahman, one feels that everything different from Brahman is unreal. Had it not been for the well-known difference between illusion and phenomenon (*prātibhāsika* and *vyavahārika*) which gives us the concept of unreality, the unreality of phenomenon would have been inconceivable, as being absolutely without analogy; *moksha* would have been an abrupt irrational affair. On the other hand, had it not been for the implicit consciousness of Brahman or Reality, there would have been no difference between truth and untruth within phenomena. Thus the absolute of inference is Brahman informing all know-

ledge against illusion within the phenomenal region and availing himself of this self-created antithesis to negate the whole phenomenal existence, to work out *Karma* by *Karma*, and thus to return to His undifferented self. This process of Brahman is *Isvara* or Hegel's Absolute Idea.

Upamāna.

111. *Upamāna* is the source of the knowledge of similarity. It is an independent *pramāna*. Whatever gives us new and certain knowledge is *pramāna*. Now the knowledge of similarity is certainly *new* knowledge, not mere memory. It is direct knowledge, not inferential, for it is felt to be so; besides, what possible proof can there be of similarity? Can it be called 'perception' of similarity? No; two like things may not be both presented at the same time. Yet, it may be urged the idea of the one and presentation of the other are synchronous; and is not perception itself a presentative-representative process? The reply is, this will explain only the perception of the common elements, not the consciousness of the *relation* of similarity. If, however, the relation be taken *only as a feeling*, as it is taken by all thorough-going empiricists, *e.g.*, by the Buddhists (cf. Sankara's reply to this, Section 49), by Mill (in his *Logic*), and by Spencer (in his *Psychology*), it may no doubt be said to be perceived. But knowledge is always viewed in Vedānta, not from the empirical standpoint, but from the standpoint of the self as spontaneity. It may be objected that from this standpoint, the consciousness of similarity is the same as the recognition of identity (knowledge which is mere memory, no new knowledge or *anubhava* at all). But they can hardly be taken to be the same. It will not do to say with some psychologists that similar things have an identical element and that suggestion of a similar is only assimilation followed by contiguous association. The artificiality of such a view is manifest. Identity is no doubt the truth of the similarity, but the psychological difference between the two is absolute to us, so long as we are confined to empirical consciousness. In the ecstatic intuition of Brahman, one is not conscious of a similarity with (or difference from) other experiences. The consciousness of similarity lies midway between the blind feeling of familiarity and the ecstatic intuition of identity. In this consciousness, there is a process, a swinging of the self backward and forward, bespeaking a limitation of its freedom. Hence it is a new kind of *pramāna*. First B is felt to be like A and then, as a result of it, A is felt to be like B. B at first suggests its similar A through the *function* of similarity (cf. Bradley on Association in his *Principles* of

Logic), though here, too, as in the case of the *function* of *vyāpti* in inference, it is consciously operative (Section 104) ; and then the self swings back from A to B (*i.e.*, the functional activity of similarity is transformed into the substantive consciousness of similarity).

Āgama.

112. *Vākya*, a sentence or series of sentences in which there is a principal one to which the others are subordinate, is said to be a *pramāṇa* or independent source of knowledge. The right appreciation of this *pramāṇa* will depend on the understanding of a certain theory of language with which it is bound up. When we say, a word *means* a thing, we do not mean that the word reminds us of the idea of a thing. We may no doubt consciously pause to remember or visualise the ideas, but this remembering is not understanding the meaning of the word, any more than any irrelevant idea, of which we are reminded by a word, is a part of the meaning. The word *directly* refers to the thing, expresses the thing, *touches* it (Bṛh. Upanishad I, V, 3) in a sense. Psychologists speak of the primitive tendency to *reify* names, but have we got beyond this reification even now ? With the same *naïveté* with which we objectify our ideas in perception, we *objectify the word*. The free concept not only requires the name for its support but is identical with it, though transcending it. Just as the presentative and representative elements of perception are not only associated but identified, being covered by the same determination of the self and objectified by it, so too in conception, the same determination of the self gives the name and the concept an identical object-reference. This unity of the name and the concept works unconsciously even in perception.

113. The sentence at once refers to an objective relation. The moment it is employed (provided of course it is a complete sentence, satisfying certain conditions, to be explained presently) a belief is generated in something objective. So Mill argued against the conceptualistic theory of judgment that 'the sun is hot' does not mean that the idea of the sun is the idea of hot. The copula of a judgment is the self pointing necessarily to an object and the unity of the sentence is but this self clothed in language. The primordial objective reference of a judgment is a provisional belief, a belief, it may be, with a certain general cautiousness induced by experience ; if it is only *thought*, it is at any rate *continuous* with knowledge. The mere absence of conflict with other evidence is sufficient to turn it into knowledge : we do not require a positive confirmation by other evidence.

114. The understanding or the self in judgments transcends judgments and points to the Ideas of the Reason or noumena. They are to be realised only in ecstatic intuition, but till that is forthcoming, the necessary thought of them must have some intuition-basis, *viz.*, a name. Yet just as an Idea of the Reason intrinsically spurns all sense-intuition as being completely inadequate, so too ordinary names constitute only the means by which such an Idea is pointed to, not its support or *expression*. Each noumenon demands its true expression, and as Schopenhauer remarked, a potent musical sound constitutes its direct objectification whereas other æsthetic symbols are mere imitations of its grosser objectifications. Such potent sound-symbols are supplied by the *mantras*, by such mystic syllables as the *Om*, the power of which is not to be judged by any *a priori* reasoning but only through the persistent attempt to realise them by devout intonation. A conventional word comes to *mean* a thing, to be provisionally *identified* with a thing, only through this necessary demand of the thing for its true sound-symbol.

115. The same result is reached in another way. Though every *vākya*, as having a direct objective intention, has the appearance of impersonality, yet as it may be ambiguous or false and may have reference to phenomenal truth, a subjective personal element has also to be taken into account. It is only in true statements about the supersensuous that this personal element is wholly eliminated. The supersensuous, as has been already explained (Section 84), to be thought at all, must have been revealed. The Vedas claim to be the repository of all such true statements about the supersensuous; and whether the claim is allowed or not, the true revelation, wherever it is found, must have also the true form, and therefore the perfection or the sacredness of it must transfigure every sound (or letter) composing it.

116. To this theory of the identity between thought and language, Nyaya takes an objection which easily connects itself with the conceptualistic theory of the judgment. The subject and predicate of a judgment are, according to it, subsumed under the same abstract universal. In modern language, the proposition states the 'congruence or conflict of concepts.' The sentence, then, has not an immediate, objective reference; the objective reference is mediate, *i.e.*, gained through inference like the following: Sentences (satisfying certain conditions) in the past gave rise to thoughts which were found to accord with objective relations; here is a sentence (satisfying these conditions), therefore it is expected to accord with objective relations.' In the last resort, then, a word is taken to be eternally connected with its meaning by mere convention (*Sanketa*) or by the Will of God (*Īṣvarechchhā*). In the case of

the Vedas, they are taken to be a system of sounds *created* by the personal author, *Iśvara* (*pauruṣeya*).

117. Vedānta, however, holds that the system of sounds is not created but only manifested. When a letter is articulated it is not created but only manifested in sensuous form (*dhvani*). Whenever a sound is produced, we recognise it as 'that sound.' If we are to believe in this recognition, every distinctive sound-form must be taken to have a persistence, not as air-vibration, but as sound-form (in its immediacy, as sensuous objectivity). The manifestation alone is in time but the sound-form is eternal. Thus the eternity of 'names' (*nāma-rūpa*) and the impersonal reality of the Word are intelligible. The question of the *primum cognitum* naturally leads to the theory of the eternal pre-existence of all differences that come to be manifested (Section 42). The Word which is thus manifested to us is to be regarded as the Word existent in all previous cycles, now freely *remembered* and manifested by *Iśvara*. So *Virāj* at birth remembered he was Brahman ('*aḥam Brahmāsmi*' —*Bṛh. Upaniṣad*). To *Iśvara*, who is eternally free in intelligence and volition, all these remembrances before each creation (*sṛiṣṭi*) are one, and all these *sṛiṣṭis* are but the timeless actualisation of the same Vedas or objective Reason. To the individual, however, the manifestation in a particular cycle is *new*.

118. The Word is co-eternal with *Iśvara*, both being Infinite determinations of Brahman, and it is noticeable that the same word *śakti* or power is used to indicate both the relation of *Iśvara* to created (manifested) things and the relation of the Word (and therefore any word) to its objective meaning. In both cases, this *śakti*, though but *māyā* investing Brahman (Section 52), is turned into an impersonal reality by the irradiation of Brahman.

119. The meaning of a word is two-fold, direct (*śakya*) and implied (*lakṣhya*). The object which is directly meant is that towards which the word functions through its *śakti*. A word refers to a thing through its *jāti* or class. The reference to the individual is not independent of the reference to the universal (substance and attribute being taken to be identical in Vedānta), except in cases where the name directly points to the thing. The *śakti* is there said to be *svarūpa-satī* (non-connotative reference) but not *jñātā-hetu*, i.e., not functioning through *reason*, i.e., not applying to the individual *because* of its possessing certain attributes. No doubt the direct reference of a word to (or its identity with) the universal also is unaccountable, but it is still *jñātā-hetu*, i.e., self-conscious reference and not a mere pointing out with the finger. Although essence and an existent

partaking of the essence (*viśeṣhaṇa* and *viśeṣhya*) are not different in reality, they are absolutely distinct aspects to the judging or discursive reason. The self of the understanding is, as Kant said, for the objective judgment, is unconsciously immanent in the empirical object, and at the same time it is an Idea of the Reason, a noumenon transcending the empirical object.

120. The reference to the individual through the universal is to be taken as only an implied reference or *lakṣhaṇā*. This *lakṣhaṇā* is not the function of a single word but of the whole sentence. The sentence reacts on each word that it contains. How is that possible? How do *śakya* and *lakṣhya* blend? Just as in perception, the concept unconsciously synthesises the intuition, so in a judgment the copular unity modifies each of the terms. 'A is B' is really equivalent to 'AB is AB.' The sentence is an organic unity and each word in it partakes of the common life. The judgment has a tendency to lapse into a concept. This is noticeable in eulogistic or abusive sentences which are not meant to be literally taken but express simply praise or abuse. Ultimately the sentence unity is only for the knowledge of particular objects, and the members of this unity, the concepts, also refer to them.

121. Not every combination of words, however, constitutes a true sentence, but only such as has the conditions of *ākāṃkṣhā*, *yogyatā*, *āsatti*, and *tātparya*. These might be roughly translated as 'syntactical connexion' (the mutual demand of the essential parts of a sentence for one another, as the demand of a verb for its subject, of a transitive verb for its object, etc.) 'compatibility of meaning' (of parts of the sentence), 'proximity of the parts,' and the 'objective intention.' The abstract assertive form of a sentence is determined by *ākāṃkṣhā*, as the self thinks of object through the categories, though sometimes the assertive form appears almost in its purity as in the appositional construction (*abhedānvaya*) 'this pot is a blue pot,' where there is no *ākāṃkṣhā* ('syntactical connexion' therefore is too wide a rendering). This assertive form, determinate or otherwise, may be perfect, though there may not be compatibility of meaning, as in 'this square is round.' This compatibility of meaning is what is ordinarily called consistency, though it has a material aspect, too, for in one sense even a self-contradictory sentence is conceivable through the propositional form. *Āsatti* or the proximity of the parts has reference to the articulatory or written form of a sentence rather than to the thought-unity, though this form is but the expression of the unity. It is that which makes us understand omitted words in elliptical constructions and unites the direct meaning of the words of a

sentence with their implied meaning. *Tātparya* is the capacity of a sentence to produce objective knowledge. It is not the subjective intention of the person uttering the sentence, though in cases of ambiguity the subjective intention has to be taken into account. It is the objective intention, which, in cases of ambiguity or the like, is not contradicted by the subjective intention. So a true sentence, even when uttered by one not understanding or misunderstanding it, has an intrinsic *tātparya*. If *yogyatā* be the formal compatibility of meaning, *tātparya* is compatibility in a material reference, the unity of the sentence and the corresponding objective relation. There might be higher unities, too, but these go beyond the sentence form.

122. The first thought roused by a sentence may be one of doubt or misunderstanding; should it then be said that the objective knowledge produced by a sentence is dependent on a prior belief induced by other evidences? No, says Vedānta; a sentence by itself has the objective reference. The knowledge of the objective relations through other *pramāṇas* may no doubt remove doubts and misunderstanding, but is not necessarily demanded by the sentence. The sentence shines by its own light. The ascertainment of the meaning of a sentence, however, may be aided by the knowledge of the topic through other evidences, as in the case of sentences having secular reference. In the case of revealed texts, however, the meaning is evolved through *mīmāṃsā* of the texts themselves, i.e., through their mutual criticism and not through any extraneous *pramāṇa*; for no other *pramāṇa* can determine of the super-sensible.

Arthāpatti.

123. *Arthāpatti* is the supposition (or conception) of the premises, reason, or cause from the conclusion, consequence, or effect. Here is one getting stout though he does not take food during the day—the reason supposed is that he takes food at night. It includes all inference through *vyatireki* *linga*, i.e., negative mark or middle term, which, according to Vedānta, is not inference at all. In reference to the stock example given in Nyāya of *Kevāli-vyatireki* inference, 'earth differs from other primal matters, for it has smell,' Vedānta would point out that here earth, as a new primal matter, is conceived only, not inferred. It is like the framing of a hypothesis from given facts. So, too, where Nyāya holds that the major premise is reached both through positive and negative evidences, Vedānta holds that inference from it appeals to the positive instances or facts only; the negative instances simply define the positive

instances, enable us to *conceive* the major premise clearly. The so-called inductive methods are therefore mixtures of *anumāna* and *arthāpatti*, deduction and hypothesits. In all inductive method there is an element of hypothesis, *i.e.*, an assuring of ourselves, before the deductive verification, whether by tact or by conscious method, that in the absence of a certain antecedent, a consequent will also be absent. In the conscious framing of a hypothesis, our aim (though not always accomplished) is to find out something explaining facts that no alternative supposition will explain. In fact all hitting at the cause, all solving of riddles, all colligation by concepts involve a conscious or sub-conscious employment of negative instances, suggested by the positive data—and this is *arthāpatti*. This appears clearly in understanding omitted words in a sentence. So, too, a negation presupposes an affirmation, the presupposing being *arthāpatti*.

Anupalabdhi.

124. *Abhāva* is negation, including non-existence relative whether to all time, to particular times, or to particular natures. How is it known? It can no doubt be inferred but can it be perceived? It may be a percept, but the percept is then not the effect of a process of perception directed towards it. The self sometimes may not perceive a thing, even though it exerts the perceptive activity, yet the percept of the locus, *minus* that thing, is therefore the percept of the minus-ness or *abhāva*. But we cannot say that the percept of this *abhāva* is the result of the process of perception directed towards it; the perceptive process is directed only to the locus of the *abhāva*, not to the *abhāva* or to the thing that is non-existent. The non-existence of the thing, therefore, is an accidental percept *implicated* in the percept of its locus and not the intended objective of the actual process.

125. What is meant by saying that a percept is at once differentiated from everything else? Does it involve an explicit perception of the difference? No. In the stage of thought, the relation itself is definitely attended to, but in the stage of perception, it is only sub-consciously, implicitly present. The substantive presentation or percept is alone explicitly perceived. But then what is this *implicitness* of its relations from the point of view of the self's spontaneity? Need we admit a new process, a new *pramāṇa* for this implicit percept of difference? Why not call it implicit perceptive process only? From the point of view of the self knowing or functioning, this 'implicitness' is meaningless, being only a metaphor borrowed from the unintelligent object. So the language of implicit and explicit is not employed in Vedānta at all. So

in inference, where one might have said that the *tritiya-linga-parāmarśa* of Nyaya (Section 103) gives at any rate the *implicit* articulations of the inferential act, Vedānta prefers to say that there is a single mediating function, and no substantive mental state somewhere out of the ken of consciousness, as the word 'implicit' would imply. It marks an essential difference between a priori-ism on the one hand, and intuitionism and empiricism on the other. Should we not admit a passive or presentative side to this functioning? We may, but the self, while functioning in a particular way, cannot at the same time apprehend the functioning in its passive aspect as object, for the self is identified with the envelope of that passivity (or ignorance). It may view it, while shaking it off, as an outworn slough. When we speak of *pramāṇa* or logical evidence, we view the mental process from the point of view of function and not of passivity. Hence it will not do to say that implicit perception is the process of which the result is the percept of *abhāva*. For implicit perception, we have to substitute a distinctive positive function of the mind, *anupalabdhi*. When the *abhāva* of a thing capable of being perceived is cognised where no other *pramāṇa* can take cognisance of it, it is cognised through this *anupalabdhi*. It has for its object not the absent thing but the absence itself. It is the bare awareness of the absence, though what is absent may not be known. Again the thing that is absent must be, unlike spiritual merit or demerit (Section 95), capable of being perceived, *i.e.*, it must be of the same order of reality as its locus which is perceived; otherwise the percept of its absence cannot be implicated in the percept of its locus. The negation must not be absolute indeterminate negation: it must be the negation of something intuitable.

126. *An objection*: If *abhāva* be a percept, though not the result of a perceptive process directed towards it, is it a percept even in the illusion of *abhāva*? In the case of the nacre taken for silver, the objectivity of the silver is constituted by its implicit subjective existence (Section 99) or *anirvachanīyatva*. Has the illusory *abhāva* also this 'inexplicable' existence? No, it may be replied: here we have *anyathā-khyāti* (Section 100). Objectivity is through implicit subjectivity in those illusions only in which the mind and the senses are in contact with the object mistaken. But here the object mistaken being *abhāva*, they are not in contact with it, *i.e.*, although the objective appearance is there, it has no subjective counterpart. If there is anything at all, it must be the implicit subjectivity of the absence of sensation, *i.e.*, the implicit consciousness of the absence. This is only *partially* similar to the implicit subjectivity of the silver in the case of the nacre. The consciousness of absence is

half-way between positive and negative, and because knowing comprehends and also transcends the known, it is, relatively speaking, phenomenally negative and really positive. Not that the illusory objective appearance of *abhāva* is Brahman, for though Brahman is the substrate or *adhīsthāna* of *māyā* and so of all phenomenal and illusory existence, it is not their *upādāna* or modifiable material. (Brahman is still sometimes spoken of as the material cause of the universe. As against the non-intelligent *pradhāna* of Sankhya, Vedānta proposes a spiritual material, Brahman; but then it is not naked Brahman but rather Brahman as informing *māyā*.) So the implicit consciousness of the absence of sensation is not the same as the implicit consciousness of the pure self but rather that of *manas* (or its objective obverse) which is the material capable of being differentiated into the sensation-modes though now without them.



नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय

Analysis.

I. AN APPROACH THROUGH PSYCHOLOGY (Sections 1—31).

Importance of the psychology of waking, dream and dreamless sleep (Section 1). Empirical account of a dream ; no sensation ; consciousness of the body at a minimum (2—3). Does it demand a new dimension of psychical existence ? Impression and idea qualitatively distinct. Dreams as pure ideas turned into percepts (4—5). Which is more real, dream or waking ? Not sensation but idea gives truth, though idea in presence of sensation is felt to be less real. Dreams, though illusory, have wider possibilities than waking (6—9).

Possibilities of self-conscious dream and dreamless sleep (10—11). Timeless synthetic concepts behind concrete knowledge on the same level as dreamless sleep, where the self is immediately self-conscious (12—14). Vedantic discussion of this state (15—16). Parallelism between different views about this state and those about self-consciousness in European philosophy. Kant, Hegel, and Vedanta on self-consciousness (17—19). Difference between Kant's self and Vedantic *ātman* (20). Spencer and Kant on indeterminate consciousness of the Unknowable (20—22). Vedantic view of knowledge (23).

Samādhi (two forms), the concrete form of this indeterminate consciousness ; actualised states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep (24—25). Difference between dreamless sleep and *samādhi* (26—27). *Samādhi* and discursive reason compared (28). Relation between *savikalpa* and *nirvikalpa samādhi* (29).

Waking, dream, dreamless sleep, and ecstasy constitute the gradation of existence ; gradation between subject and object, truth and untruth (30). Projections of dream, etc., on waking plane ; parallelism with empirical and *a priori* psychology (31).

II. VEDANTIC METAPHYSICS (Sections 32—83).

The theory of *adhyātma*, *adhibhūta*, etc., dimly traceable in the Upanishads, brought out (32—38). *Devatā*, the absolute unity of subject and object (33). *Loka*, the absolute intuition-medium for this unity (34). Necessity of *loka* defended against possible objections. Relation of the theory to Absolute Idealism (35—38).

Are the *devatās universalis ante rem* ? Is Vedanta realistic ? (39—45). Yes ; the sun the unity of the particular eyes and the visible things (40). But is not this aspect-realism rather

than class-realism? Yes, but these sense-aspects are substantial realities or primal matters. Reconciliation of empiricism and rationalism (41). Grades of matter, formless matter one pole and full-blown reality the other. The full-blown reality minus the formless matter is *māyā*, the matrix of eternal 'names and forms' or *principia individuationis* (42). Realistic class is also admitted. Vedanta versus Nyaya on *jāti*. *Jāti* not co-ordinate with *vyakti* (43—44). Three (five) systems of eternal entities in Vedanta (45).

Vedanta versus Hegel on the identity of contradictories. Vedantic discussions bearing on the law of contradiction (46—47). Does Vedantic realism furnish a principle of change? (48). Sankara's discussion of causality (49—51). *Panchadāśī* on *śakti* or power (52—53).

Brahman and maya, by mutual reflection, become *Isvara* with *parā-prakṛiti*, *śakti*, *aparā-prakṛiti* (54). These the archetypal concretes of *sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas* (55). *Parā-prakṛiti* is the active *buddhi* of the Lord (56). Discussion of *buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, *manas*, *chitta* (57). *Buddhi* both the object and the (determinate but undifferentiated) body of *Isvara*. Parallelism of *sattva* and *tamas* with Aristotle's actuality and potentiality. Difference between Vedanta and Aristotle (58).

Two forms of *Isvara*—*triguṇātīta* and *buddha-sattva-upādhi*. Their relation to Brahman. Distinction between the higher god and the lower god misleading (60—62). Why Brahman becomes determinate, an illegitimate question (63—64). Difficulties in the conception of *Isvara* as creator (65). A preliminary discussion of the relation between moral discipline and absolute consciousness (66) necessary to understand *Isvara* (in His two aspects) as the Absolute of both, the unity of the individual spirits (67). A further discussion of the progressive realisation of individual spirits necessary (68—69) to understand *Isvara* as the Good, the Just, as exercising *śakti* or power, as in grace maturing the *Karma* of individual spirits (70). *Sthāvaratva*, the extreme punishment (71). Fate of *sthāvara* bound up with *jīvan-mukta* souls (72), through whom as deputies, *Isvara* creates. Creation and dissolution. Trinity of *Brahmā*, *Vishnu*, *Maheśvara* (73—74).

Onward course of creation (75). Discussion of the five *Koshas* and the three bodies of the individual, to introduce the universal emanations *Hiranya-garbha*, etc. (76—77). Vedanta on the five primal matters; their relation to the elements of chemistry; 'quintupling' of these matters (78—81).

Interpretation of two cosmogonic myths, to illustrate the above (82—83).

III. VEDANTIC LOGIC (Sections 84—126).

Vedantic truths said to be revealed ; do they admit of proof? Necessity of revelation (84). Position of *manana* in Vedānta (85). Six *pramāṇas* (86). Two kinds of knowledge (87).

Pratyakṣa.—Perception is Brahman ; knowledge timeless in its empirical mode in time (88). Conditions of perception explained (89—95). Perceptual judgment (96). Perception of object as object (97). Perception of the self (98). Discussion of illusory perception (99—101).


Anumāna.—Nyaya account of *svārtha* inference (102—103). Four Vedantic objections connected with European Logic (104—106). Major premise reached through positive instance (107). Number of the instances inessential (108). Nyaya *versus* Vedānta on *parārtha* inference ; deduction of Vedānta's position from its position on *svārtha* inference (109). The absolute syllogism after Hegel (110).

Upamāna (111).

Āgama.—How *vākya* is a *pramāṇa* explained by the identity of thought and language (words, sentences, *mantras*) (112—115). Objection of Nyaya to this identity (116). Vedānta on eternity of the Word (117). *Śakti* (meaning) of the Word like the *śakti* (power) of *Isvara* (118). Two kinds of meaning (119—120). Conditions of valid *vākya* (120). A sentence by itself induces belief (122).

Arthāpatti connected with hypothesis in Inductive Logic (123).

Anupalabdhi.—*Abhāva* a percept but not the result of a perceptive process directed towards it (124). What is implicit perception from the point of view of the Self? *Anupalabdhi* a positive function of the mind (125). Discussion of the illusion of *abhāva* (126).



सत्यमेव जयते